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The First Amendment contains two religion clauses.1  But, broadly 
speaking, it generates three sets of questions.2  The first concerns the sorts
of church-state questions typically understood as raising establishment of
religion concerns.  The second concerns the individual rights questions 
typically analyzed under the rubric of free exercise of religion.3  And the 
third—which has no clause devoted to it as such, but which in some ways
is older and more deeply rooted than the other two—concerns the 
institutional autonomy of churches and religious communities.4 
*  Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School. 
1. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .”  U.S. CONST. amend. I, § 1. 
2. See Perry Dane, Constitutional Law and Religion, in A  COMPANION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 119, 119–31 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010)
[hereinafter Dane, Constitutional Law]. Cf. Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones 
v. Wolf: Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA.
L. REV. 1291, 1297 (1980) (arguing that religious institutional autonomy is a product of
the interaction of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses); Ira C. Lupu & Robert
Tuttle, Gianella Lecture: The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional 
Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 50 (2002) (suggesting that an adequate account of religious entities
in our constitutional scheme must be in at least some senses “clause-transcendent”).
3. See Dane, Constitutional Law, supra note 2, at 122. 
4. See Paul Horwitz, Freedom of the Church Without Romance, 21 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 59, 60–61 (2013). 
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I want to propose, without necessarily proving, that all three streams of
religion and law jurisprudence flow, at least in substantial part, from a
single set of master principles or master metaphors. Those metaphors 
coalesce around the idea that religion is a sovereign realm distinct from 
the state, its government, and its claims.  In James Madison’s words: 
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he
believes to be acceptable to him.  This duty is precedent, both in order of time
and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society.  Before any man can be 
considered as a member of Civil Society, he must be considered as a subject of
the Governour of the Universe: And if a member of Civil Society, who enters into
any subordinate Association, must always do it with a reservation of his duty to
the General Authority; much more must every man who becomes a member of 
any particular Civil Society, do it with a saving of his allegiance to the Universal
Sovereign.  We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no mans right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt
from its cognizance.5 
This basic jurisdictional-sovereignty conception of the relation between
religion and state is well known and routinely defended,6 though it has always
been and seems increasingly controversial.7  The conception comes particularly 
5. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, 
in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 29, 30 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Lib. Am. 1999).  As Michael 
McConnell has insightfully emphasized, Madison appreciated the reality of “citizenship 
ambiguity” facing religious believers more clearly than other supporters of church-states 
separation such as John Locke and Thomas Jefferson.  Michael W. McConnell, Believers
as Equal Citizens, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 90, 92–96
(Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000).  In that sense, his account actually echoed that of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, though he sharply differed from Rousseau’s statist conclusion that this 
ambiguity was “manifestly bad.”  See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
181 (Penguin Books 1968). 
6. For some recent defenses, see, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations 
and—and among—Civil Rights: Separation, Toleration, and Accommodation, 88 SO. CAL.
L. REV. 493, 507 (2015); Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional Conception of Church 
Autonomy, in CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 19 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, &
Zoë Robinsons eds., 2016).  See also PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS
175 (2013); Perry Dane, Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 
963 (1991) [hereinafter Dane, Maps]; Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952
Term–Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91, 91–93
(1953); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1512 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Free
Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1152 (1990); Max 
L. Stackhouse, Religion, Rights, and the Constitution, in AN UNSETTLED ARENA: RELIGION
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 92, 99 (Ronald C. White, Jr. & Albright G. Zimmerman eds., 1990).
7. Prominent recent critiques of the sovereignty idea have focused most distinctly,
though not exclusively, on the institutional autonomy prong of law and religion jurisprudence.  
See, e.g., Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 
99 VA. L. REV. 917, 919 (2013).  But those critiques also rightly recognize that recognizing
the “sovereignty” of religious institutions is “the nose of an enormous camel” with
profound implications for individual religious rights as well.  Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom 
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easily to legal pluralists of various stripes, who refuse to assume that the
state holds a monopoly on the phenomenon of law and legal obligation.8 
In my own work, I have taken this basic idea just a bit further, though, 
suggesting that the relationship between government and religion should 
be understood as an “existential encounter” in which each side tries to 
make sense of and decide whether or how to make room for the other.9 
That term “existential encounter” is meant to convey several important 
ideas.10  First, it suggests that what is at stake here is not merely a set of 
legal doctrines or policy prescriptions, but something deeper and more 
constitutive. The sovereign nation-state, in some sense, looks out at the 
world around it and sees other entities that do not easily fit into its own 
internal sovereign architecture.11  Some of these are other nation-states.12 
Some might be other types of essentially secular, but non-state, human 
associations.13  And others are, or should be, communities—large and small, 
organized or not, united or splintered—whose normative commitment is 
to a transcendent source of meaning and obligation.  In all these cases, the 
of the Church” and the Authority of the State, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 149 
(2013).
8. See, e.g., PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM 4–5 (2012); 
VÍCTOR M. MUÑIZ-FRATICELLI, THE STRUCTURE OF PLURALISM 3 (2014); Robert M. Cover,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4
(1983) [hereinafter The Supreme Court]; John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J.
LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 1 (1986).  In recent years, at least some of the 
debate on legal pluralism and its implications has shifted to Europe. For an important recent
collection of essays representing various voices in the conversation, see RELIGION AND
LEGAL PLURALISM (Russell Sandberg ed., 2015).  For a particularly skeptical approach, 
though not one especially interested in the religious dimension of the question in the 
context of the European Union, see Lorenzo Zucca, Monism and Fundamental Rights, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 331, 352–53 (Julie Dickson &
Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012). 
9. See, e.g., Dane, Maps, supra note 6, at 970; Perry Dane, The Intersecting Worlds of
Religious and Secular Marriage, in 4 LAW AND RELIGION: CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 385, 
404 (Richard O’Dair & Andrew Lewis eds., 2001) [hereinafter Dane, Intersecting Worlds]
(“[T]he impulse to appreciating legal pluralism arises, not merely out of theoretical 
commitments, but out of a process of existential encounter, as each normative system asks
itself precisely what is going on outside the reach of its most solipsistic concerns.”); Perry
Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1715, 1772 [hereinafter Dane, “Omalous” 
Autonomy].
10. Dane, Intersecting Worlds, supra note 9. 



























   










sovereign state must step outside a purely internal frame and try to make 
sense of the existential Other.14 
Second, though we can try to articulate purposes and justifications for
the legal structures arising out of this encounter, they are not at the end of
the day reducible to purposes and justifications.15  On this score, it is useful
to compare the existential encounter to the sort of I-Thou relationship 
described by Martin Buber.16  That is to say, it is a meeting of selves before
it is an analysis of normative structures. 
Third, the encounter between church and state, though this piece is not
actually required by Buber’s description of the I-Thou relationship,17 is
powerfully two-sided.18  Just as the state needs to make sense of the religious
nomos and decide how to understand the boundaries of competence and
deference between the two realms, religious communities need to make
sense of the state and decide to what extent its claims can be accommodated 
within what might otherwise seem the absolute and cosmic claims of
divine governorship.19 
Fourth, while these master metaphors of jurisdiction, sovereignty, and 
dialogical encounter are by some lights jurisprudentially radical, their
practical normative payoff is—at least in the abstract—more complicated 
and open-ended. Religious traditions can recognize the legitimacy and 
authority of the state without necessarily subordinating themselves to it in 
all cases. And, the state can acknowledge the claims of religious communities
without necessarily deferring to them.
B. 
I also want to propose that only a robust, jurisdictional, legal pluralist 
account of religion and law—not mine, necessarily, but some such robust 
14. Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, supra note 9, at 1771–72. 
15. See Dane, Maps, supra note 6, at 970 (“The recognition of another sovereign 
does not serve a purpose, as such, though purposes can be articulated for it.  It is more of 
an existential encounter, a fact—if a socially constructed fact—of the world.”). 
16. See generally MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., 1958). 
I discuss the relevance of Buber at greater length in another work-in-progress.  Perry Dane, 
Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law, Martin Buber and the Existential Encounter of
State and Religious Authority, Address at Dialogue in the 21st Century: A Martin Buber
Memorial Conference (Apr. 23, 2015) . 
17. BUBER, supra note 16, at 131 (“Yet there are some I-Thou relationships which
in their nature may not unfold to full mutuality if they are to persist in that nature.”) 
18. Nevertheless, as Robert Cover brilliantly explained, the ways in which this 
mutual encounter lays out on each side will not be identical or neatly symmetric. After
all, it remains the state, when all is said and done, that holds most of the levers of sheer 
physical violence.  See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 
1601 (1986) [hereinafter Cover, Violence].
19. Cover, The Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 28–29. 
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account—can begin to make sense of the peculiar shape of the distinct 
problems that arise under the various strands of our constitutional and sub-
constitutional conversation on the topic. In particular, only such a conception
can begin to respond to the recurring question whether religion is
“special.”20  For, of course, if religion is not special, then it is not clear why 
the government may not establish Presbyterianism even though it can
establish a commitment to capitalism or evidence-based medicine, or why
it might exempt religious believers but not others from neutral laws of
general applicability.21  Some commentators have tried to defend the
specialness of religion by way of a functional account of religion’s place 
in the liberal polity.22  But that project risks giving away the game.  A more 
apt response, from a jurisdictional, dialogical, and legal pluralist perspective,
is to answer the question with a question:  What makes the state special?23 
For only by asking that question can we overcome the assumption that 
religion must fit neatly into an account of the liberal polity that already
has the state as its Archimedean referee, or, to use a different image,
overcome the assumption that religion must find its place, if any, as a 
character in a drama whose author is liberal political theory and whose 
20. For some recent, important skepticism on that question, see, for example, BRIAN
LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 3 (2012); Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not 
Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1351 (2012). 
21. See Schwartzman, supra note 20, at 1352–53. 
22. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN 
LAW & CULTURE TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 15 (1993); Andrew Koppelman, 
“Religion” as a Bundle of Legal Proxies: Reply to Micah Schwartzman, 51 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1079, 1081 (2014).
23. See generally Griffiths, supra note 8, at 27; Ralf Michaels, The Re-State-ment 
of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Challenge from Global Legal 
Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1258 (2005) (“We cannot go back to the illusion that 
the state is the only relevant creator of norms in the world and so continue choice of law 
as before.”); Gordon R. Woodman, Ideological Combat and Social Observation: Recent
Debate about Legal Pluralism, 42 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 21, 22 (1998) (elaborating on the 
concept of legal pluralism). See also Jacob Affolter, Challenging the State: Teaching 
Alternative Historiographies in Early Modern Politics, 46 METAPHILOSOPHY 398, 399 
(2015).  To be sure, the state is special in certain important respects.  For some efforts to
make sense of its distinctive characteristics within the framework of legal pluralism, see,
for example, Cover, The Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 11; Cover, Violence, supra note 
18, at 1628; Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC. REV. 869, 879 (1988). 
See also Dane, Maps, supra note 6, at 963 (“Modern states are not like other communities. 
No amount of talk will change that.  But those differences can be the occasion for, rather
than an obstacle to, mutual recognition.  Indeed, one of my main themes will be that sovereignty,
and the relationship of sovereigns among sovereigns, can take forms more diverse, and
subtle, than we usually imagine.”)
 57






   
 
















     
director is the state.  To be sure, answering a question with a question does 
not settle anything, as such, though it can reframe the dialectical burden.24 
As I suggested at the start, my goal here is not proof.  But allowing both 
questions to sit side by side, without privileging either, does create the 
opening for genuine dialogical encounter and the possible normative and
conceptual fruits of that encounter. 
C. 
From a jurisdictional, legal pluralist, and dialogical perspective, the
three strands of the law of religion and state can then be understood as 
playing out three different aspects of the fundamental encounter. I have
in other writing argued that the establishment clause largely reflects the
“wholesale” part of the relationship.25 It constructs, from the state’s
constitutional perspective, the general map delineating the competencies 
and appropriate jurisdictional domains of the state and religion.  The free
exercise clause—particularly in its consideration of religion-based
exemptions—is then the retail piece of the puzzle.  It considers adjusting 
the wholesale map to take into account the particular and often radically
differing and even apparently idiosyncratic commitments of particular 
religious normative systems.  Meanwhile, religious institutional autonomy is
in some sense both wholesale and retail.  On the one hand, it draws very
general lines, recognizing the self-governing rights of all religious 
communities, regardless of their specific religious commitments.  But it 
enforces those lines with respect to the authority claims of particular
parties such as churches. That helps explain why religious institutional
autonomy seems to straddle the free exercise and establishment clauses 
and, if the truth be told, should really be treated as a third, distinct if
unwritten, religion clause. 
D. 
All this, though, leaves a major challenge and conundrum:  If the three 
strands of religion and state jurisprudence really do all flow in large part
from a single basic idea, and if that idea is as deep, rich, powerful, and
 24. See Imran Aijaz, Jonathan McKeown-Green & Aness Webster, Burdens of 
Proof and the Case for Unevenness, 27 ARGUMENTATION 259, 267 (2013). But cf. Douglas 
N. Walton, Questions-Asking Fallacies, in QUESTIONS AND QUESTIONING 195, 211 (Michael 
Meyer ed. 1988) (“Generally, it cannot be allowed in reasonable dialogue that an answerer 
should always have the right to reply to a question with another question.”). 
25. See Dane, Constitutional Law, supra note 2, at 127; Perry Dane, The Varieties 
of Religious Autonomy, in CHURCH AUTONOMY: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY 117, 120 (Gerhard
Robbers ed., 2001). 
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basic as I have suggested, and if no paler principle will do, then why do 
the three pieces of religion and state jurisprudence—free exercise,
establishment, and religious institutional autonomy—both look so 
different from each other and, as they have played out, manifest such different
levels of intensity and degrees of commitment to the allegedly singular
common principle at their heart?  And why do they sometimes even seem 
to clash? 
Such tensions appear along each of the seams in the fabric of our
jurisprudence of religion and state.26  The particular puzzle most germane 
to this symposium, however, is this:  How do we explain, as either a matter
of doctrinal consistency or historical narrative, what might seem at first 
glance to be a glaring disjunction in American law between the jurisprudence
of free exercise and the jurisprudence of religious institutional autonomy? 
To wit:  For almost 140 years,27 except for a short golden age of fewer
than thirty years between Sherbert v. Verner28 and Employment Division v.
Smith,29 the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the right of religious
believers even to make prima facie claims to religion-based exemptions
from non-discriminatory, otherwise-applicable, laws.30  And even though
26. Most dramatically, even those of us who believe that a separationist view of the 
establishment clause and a robustly exemption-respecting view of the free exercise clause 
can be harmonized by way of the common thread of the jurisdictional metaphor still have
to admit at least some tension between the two.  Cf. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 
719 (1981) (“There is, in a sense, a ‘benefit’ to Thomas deriving from his religious beliefs,
but this manifests no more than the tension between the two Religious Clauses which the
Court resolved in Sherbert . . . .”); Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A 
Comment on Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L.J. 433, 445 (1995) (“The 
pre-1980s Court never explicitly faced up to this contradiction between special solicitude
for religious freedom and special, broad prohibitions on any aid to religion.”).  Such 
questions, however, are beyond the scope of this Article, and this symposium.
27.  The first pivotal case was Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879). 
28.  Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
29.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
30. The classic cases before Sherbert included Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 
158, 170 (1944); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594–95 (1940)
(“Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious
toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the 
promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.  The mere possession of religious convictions 
which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen 
from the discharge of political responsibilities.”), overruled on other grounds by, W. Va. 
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145, 161–67 (1879). See also infra note 129 (discussing history of free exercise
jurisprudence prior to Sherbert). 
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Congress31 and some states32 responded to Smith by enacting various
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs), the original consensus
behind such legislation has eroded after only about two decades,33 with 
some observers questioning the entire allegedly “dubious”34 or “unsettling”35 
idea of even countenancing claims for such exemptions.  Meanwhile, for 
an even longer period, from at least the nineteenth century to today, the 
Court has consistently held, albeit with variations and bumps in the road, 
that principles of religious institutional autonomy essentially immunize 
churches and similar groups, whether or not they are facing a direct religious 
conflict, from even non-discriminatory, otherwise-applicable laws trenching 
on their decision-making with respect to internal affairs and self-governance.36 
There is no single or simple answer to these puzzles and apparent 
inconsistencies.  The path of normative and doctrinal development is 
complex.  And the analysis will necessarily have both descriptive and
prescriptive elements.  I have myself chipped away at bits and pieces of 
these questions in other work.37 
My goal here is not to offer an entire or comprehensive account.  I do,
however, want to suggest some broad categories of explanation, provide 
some examples, and then focus on one distinct theme, which I refer to as 
the dynamic of “double-coding.”  I will explicate that idea in more detail 
below. I will also situate it more precisely in the larger account of pluralism 
and multivocality that to my mind is just as important as the story of religion 
and state itself.38  But suffice it to say for now that (a) legal systems, much 
like individuals, are bound to be solipsistic, (b) that solipsism will make
it particularly difficult to admit explicitly the deeper implications of ideas 
31. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–41, 107 Stat. 
1488 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4). 
32. See generally Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty after Gonzales: A Look 
at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466, 475–78 (2010). 
33. For a valuable account of the shift in sentiment, see Paul Horwitz, The Hobby
Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014).  See also Mark Tushnet, Accommodation
of Religion Thirty Years On, 38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1 (2015) (examining the developments
in the consensus of the “accommodation principle” since the publication of Michael 
McConnell’s Accommodation of Religion).
34. See Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 
38 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 35, 35 (2015). 
35. Kelefah Sanneh, Blessings in Disguise, NEW YORKER, May 5, 2014, at 19, 20. 
For my reply, see Perry Dane, Letter to the Editor, Competing Ethics, NEW YORKER, June 
23, 2014, at 5.
 36. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132
S.Ct. 694, 705–06 (2012); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 107–09 (1952); 
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1872). 
37. See, e.g., Constitutional Law, supra note 2, at 119–31; Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 
supra note 9.
 38. See infra notes 91–120 and accompanying text. 
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such as “sovereignty” or “existential encounter” with respect to non-state 
normative systems or communities, (c) but the existential encounter can
still occur, even if its explicit recognition is suppressed, (d) one way to
reconcile these opposing possibilities is through “double-coding,” where 
a less provocative surface formulation coexists in a sort of simultaneous 
vision with a more radical principle just below that surface, and (e) the
success of such double-coding will depend both on the coherence of the
surface formulation on its own terms and on the system’s willingness to
allow the deeper principle to give it depth, to create a stereoscopic vision 
that is faithful to both.  In making sense of these abstract ideas, I will be 
telling a very specific story, arguing that where we find ourselves is in some
measure the product of contingent doctrinal development and conceptual 
choices.
Before delving into the complications of double-coding, however, I
need to take on two other tasks.  The first is simply to explain in a little 
more detail why, at least given the premises of this Article, the discrepancy
between religion-based exemptions doctrine and institutional autonomy
doctrine—in shorthand, between Smith and Hosanna-Tabor—is a problem.
The second is to canvass some more straightforward, if incomplete, structural




The domains of religion-based exemptions and religious institutional 
autonomy are different.  I have already suggested as much in discussing 
the “wholesale” and “retail” dimensions of the law of religion and state.39 
I will discuss other important differences further on in this Article.
In addition, both religious institutional autonomy and religion-based
exemptions raise complex questions and, for that matter, different complex
questions, that even as ambitious a set of master principles or metaphors 
as jurisdiction, sovereignty, and dialogical encounter metaphor can only
very partially resolve.  Thus, for example, the separationist impulse that
our doctrine of religious institutional autonomy shares with the rough 
general flow of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is one way of playing 
39. See discussion supra Section I.C.
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out the fundamental jurisdictional insight, but not the only way.40  More
generally, in earlier work, I argued that the idea of autonomy contains,
even within its own four corners, deep tensions and intractable dilemmas.41 
Autonomy has many dimensions, and respecting some of those dimensions
might well require sacrificing others.42 
40. A minimal commitment to the jurisdictional idea would exclude treating 
religion as either simply an instrument of the state or as a merely ordinary association or
expression of belief.  But it would also be consistent with either a deeply separationist and 
a more cooperative relationship between church and state.  After all, distinct sovereigns 
can cooperate. For that matter, even an explicitly religious constitution might, depending 
on its details, be consistent with the basic metaphors of jurisdiction, sovereignty, and 
dialogical encounter. See Perry Dane, Foreword: On Religious Constitutionalism, 16 RUTGERS
J.L. & RELIG. 460 (2015). The shape of our distinctive American doctrine is deeply
influenced by our specific theological heritage and specific historical experiences.  And 
that American separationist commitment has clearly steered both our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and our doctrine of religious institutional autonomy in certain directions 
rather than others. 
41. Perry Dane, The Varieties of Religious Autonomy, in  CHURCH AUTONOMY: A
COMPARATIVE SURVEY 117, 118 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 2001). 
42. See id. at 130.  Just to illustrate, that Article contains the following table, which 
specifically examines how the various approaches to church property disputes (as distinct 
from the personnel questions at issue in Hosanna-Tabor) reflect some of the competing
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Religious exemptions doctrine is equally multi-dimensional, though in 
different ways and for different reasons.  As I also discuss elsewhere, the 
full range of religion-based exemptions, including the many exemptions
recognized by specific statutes, reveal a variety of forces at work, many
of which stand in any uneasy and often dialectical relationship with the 
jurisdictional principle that has been my focus here.43 
Despite all this, though, the present challenge, to repeat, is not merely
to distinguish between religion-based exemptions and religious institutional 
autonomy, but to make some sense of the very different receptions they 
have received in the legal culture, particularly given my claim that—at least 
in outline—one set of master metaphors can and should undergird the entirety
of the law of religion and state. 
In Hosanna-Tabor, Chief Justice Roberts argued that the religion-based 
exemption problem in cases such as Smith “involved government regulation
of only outward physical acts” while institutional autonomy cases, by 
contrast, concern “government interference with an internal church decision 
that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”44  Commentators
have criticized45 and even ridiculed46 this formulation. Still, the Chief 
I will not try to unpack this table here.  I suspect that elements of it are wrong or incomplete,
and I would draw it differently today.  But my point is simply to illustrate in broad strokes 
the larger claim that tensions and trade-offs exist even entirely internal to concern for
autonomy.  Moreover, some of the choices our legal system has made, such as eventually
rejecting the “departure from doctrine” approach, even though it might be said to enforce 
certain dimensions of autonomy, have been influenced by similar choices made in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence. 
43. See Perry Dane, Scopes of Religious Exemption: A Normative Map 11–12
(April 17, 2015) (unpublished paper delivered at the Fifth Bowling Green Workshop in
Applied Ethics and Public Policy) (on file with the Bowling Green State University
Department of Philosophy) [hereinafter Dane, Scopes of Religious Exemption]. 
44. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 
707 (2012).
45. See, e.g., John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 
92 N.C. L. REV. 787, 823–24 (2014); Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-
Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821, 834–35 (2012); Mark Strasser, Making the 
Anomalous Even More Anomalous: On Hosanna-Tabor, the Ministerial Exception, and
the Constitution, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 400, 444 (2012) (“[S]uch a distinction is 
unpersuasive . . . .”). For an important effort to reformulate and defend the Chief Justice’s 
distinction, see Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of 
Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2014). 
46. See, e.g., Frederick Marc Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism and Doctrinal Incoherence 
in Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405, 431–33 (2013) (“The Native American
believers in Smith would no doubt have been interested to learn that their participation in
the ritual that rested at the spiritual center of their personal faith was a mere ‘outward
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Justice’s infelicitous language might capture a deeper instinct that would 
make sense even to a friend of the jurisdiction-sovereignty conception of 
the law of the church and state that I have been positing here. 
The argument would go something like this: As I have already emphasized, 
not only religion but also the state can legitimately claim sovereign dignity. 
And in a genuine dialogical encounter, neither side can necessarily be
expected to defer under all circumstances to the other.
The religious nomos has a sovereign stake in both the autonomy context 
and the exemptions context.  With respect to the set of issues classically 
covered by autonomy doctrine, however, the state has no legitimate competing 
sovereign interest of its own in interfering with purely internal matters of
church governance.  By contrast, the exemptions context almost always
involves a clash of sovereign claims, and while many of us who support 
robust exemptions would argue that the state should sometimes step back 
and accommodate the religious interest, it is consistent with the 
jurisdiction-sovereignty idea in broad outline for it to refuse.  In that sense,
the difference between Hosanna-Tabor and Smith could be captured by an
analogy to Brainerd Currie’s controversial but coherent distinction between 
“false conflicts” and “true conflicts” in choice of law.47 
This tempting intuition does not hold up, however.  It might be true that, 
at least in the United States today, the state has no sovereign stake in the
“internal” governance of the church as such.48  But it did arguably have a 
sovereign interest in Hosanna-Tabor in assuring the rights of disabled 
persons. And it has an interest in women’s equality,49 not to mention the
orderly functioning of contract law, property law, and the like. Other 
nations have, not implausibly, claimed secular sovereign stakes that dig
even deeper, including an interest in assuring that religious bodies not be
physical act’ that paled in comparison to a Lutheran congregation’s ‘internal faith and 
mission.’”); Michael C. Dorf, Ministers and Peyote, DORF ON LAW (Jan. 12, 2012, 12:30
AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/01/ministers-and-peyote.html [https://perma.cc/U5TW­
G2AM] (“With due respect: huh???”).
47. See  BRAINERD CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of 
Laws, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 183–84 (1963).
48. But cf. 8 RICHARD HOOKER, OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY (1648)
(articulating and defending the classic Anglican political theology in which the monarch 
is the supreme governor of the Church of England), reprinted in 8 RICHARD HOOKER, OF 
THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 128 (Arthur Stephen McGrade ed., 1989); see W. J.
TORRANCE KIRBY, RICHARD HOOKER’S DOCTRINE OF THE ROYAL SUPREMACY (1990). For
an effort to consider Hooker’s ideas in the light of more current debates about the continued
establishing of the Church of England, see R.R. Williams, Richard Hooker on the Church 
and State Report, 85.2 CHURCHMAN 99 (1970), http://biblicalstudies.org.uk/pdf/churchman/
085-02_097.pdf [https://perma.cc/MM58-74XU]. 
49. See, e.g., Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The 
Case for Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 
1049, 1053–54 (1996). 
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subject to “foreign domination.”50  My point here is not to defend these or 
other intrusions into internal religious governance, of course, but only to
reject the simple view that states have no plausible legitimate interest in
how religious groups govern themselves, select their leaders, or organize 
their affairs.51 Indeed, at least some commentators have suggested, not 
implausibly, that while autonomy doctrine purports to establish categorical 
boundaries around the internal affairs of religious groups, it actually defines 
those boundaries, if only implicitly, through the same familiar weighing 
of governmental interests that used to be a staple of constitutional free 
exercise law.52  If that is so, though, it merely deepens the puzzle of why 
50. XIANFA art. 36 (2004) (China) (providing, inter alia, that “Religious bodies and 
religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.”), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishn
pc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372964.htm [https://perma.cc/JJ65-YMKQ]; Decree
of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, No. 426, arts. 3–4 [Regulation on 
Religious Affairs] (promulgated by the State Council, Nov. 30, 2004, effective Mar. 10, 
2005) https://www.purdue.edu/crcs/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Regulations_on_Religious_
Affairs_no426.pdf [https://perma.cc/83Z7-3J8U] (English translation) (“Religious bodies, 
sites for religious activities and religious citizens shall abide by the Constitution, laws,
regulations and rules, and safeguard unification of the country, unity of all nationalities
and stability of society . . . .  All religions shall adhere to the principle of independence 
and self-governance.  Religious bodies, sites for religious activities and religious affairs
are not subject to any foreign domination.”). 
51. It might be argued that certain forms of interference in internal church affairs 
would be literally impossible.  For example, even if a state could somehow coerce the 
Catholic church to go through the motions of ordaining women as priests, it could not 
assure that when she performs the ritual of the Mass, the bread and wine in front of her 
would actually turn into the body and blood of Jesus Christ, nor could it force the members 
of the Church to believe that such transubstantiation had occurred.  But this argument only
goes so far.  To begin with, not all religious traditions conceive of ministry in such sacramental
terms, and even within traditions that do, not all ministries are sacramental.  More important, a
sufficiently determined state has available to it any number of sanctions short of attempting 
the sacramentally “impossible,” including fines, damages, and revocation of tax exempt
or charitable status. 
52. See, e.g., Lund, supra note 45, at 1189 (“Before Hosanna-Tabor, one criticism 
of the ministerial exception was that it was absolute, that it involved no balancing. But it
would be more accurate to say that the balancing happens categorically rather than case­
by-case.  Different balances between the governmental interest and the religious interest
get struck by drawing the line between ministers and non-ministers in different places.”)
(citing Jack M. Balkin, The “Absolute” Ministerial Exception, BALKANIZATION (Jan, 13, 
2012, 8:59 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/01/absolute-ministerial-exception.html
[https://perma.cc/QZF3-WBCR] (“One of the curious features of the Supreme Court’s 
version of the ministerial exception is that the rule is stated in absolute terms that eschew 
all attempts at balancing.”)).
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the Court in Smith renounced such tests in the context of adjudicating
religion-based exemptions.53 
The problem is no simpler on the other side of the ledger, for claims for 
religion-based exemptions can also raise fundamental questions about the 
jurisdictional boundaries between religion and state.  This became particularly
evident in the recent dispute over claims to exemptions under RFRA from 
the contraception mandate promulgated under the Affordable Care Act.
While some of the debate, as well as the majority opinion in the Hobby 
Lobby case, simply asked in standard fashion whether the mandate furthered 
a compelling government interest with the least restrictive means, both 
dissenters on the Court and some commentators argued that the exemptions
should be denied for a more categorical reason—because of the allegedly 
substantial cost they would impose on third parties.54  The issues here are 
complex and beyond the scope of this article.55  For what it’s worth, my
own views have evolved.56  If nothing else, the argument about third party 
53. See id. (“This is another way in which Hosanna-Tabor aligns better with
Sherbert and Yoder than with Smith: it smacks of the old compelling interest test when the
Court says that the employment laws are ‘undoubtedly important’ but still insufficient to
outweigh the religious interest.”  (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 710 (2012) (“The interest of society in the enforcement of
employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of 
religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out 
their mission.”)).
54. See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2790 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Accommodations to religious beliefs or observances, the Court 
has clarified, must not significantly impinge on the interests of third parties.); Frederick
Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception 
Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
343, 346, 349 (2014). 
55. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37; Frederick Marc Gedicks, One 
Cheer for Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party 
Employee Burdens, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 153 (2015); Marc O. DeGirolami, On the 
Claim that Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate Violate the Establishment 
Clause, CTR. FOR L. & RELIGION F. AT ST. JOHN’S U. SCH. OF L. (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://clrforum.org/2013/12/05/on-the-claim-that-exemptions-from-the-contraception­
mandate-violate-the-establishment-clause/ [https://perma.cc/388S-VE3Q] . 
56. In my student law journal note, which defended religion-based exemptions by
analogy to conflict of laws among nation-states, I nevertheless argued that a state could
justifiably apply its own law to protect “third parties not subject to the religious authority 
who would be directly affected by the granting of an exemption.”  Perry Dane, Note,
Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities, 
90 YALE L.J. 350, 368 (1980), cited in Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 720 (7th Cir. 2013). 
I emphasized that “[p]rotection of third parties is distinctive, not because it is the most
compelling state interest, but rather because in the context of relations with third parties, 
the religious adherent’s claim that his conduct should be deemed to be within the jurisdiction
of the religious source of authority becomes untenable.”  Id. at 368.  That is to say, even
“if a territory for religious concerns has been carved out and the religious proponent is 
subject to the source of authority for that territory, his action has recrossed the hypothetical
66
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effects prompts the question whether or under what circumstances employees
of a religiously-committed employer should be considered “third parties” 
with respect to that employer’s claim for exemptions.57  But be that as it
may, the arguments here about “third party” effects at least echo similar 
arguments in the institutional autonomy context that try to draw a crisp line
between the “inside” and “outside” of the religious nomos. 
Indeed, the debate over the contraceptive mandate is doubly interesting 
because, as it intensified, both sides appealed to the sort of wholesale
quasi-jurisdictional arguments that we do not ordinarily associate with
religious liberty claims.  The religious objectors argued, in effect, that the
government was impermissibly commandeering religious charitable activity 
and religiously-imbued commercial firms to effectuate public policy goals 
that it was not willing to implement itself.  The mandate’s defenders pushed
back by arguing that it was not the government that was crossing the line, 
but religious folk themselves, by entering into the world of commerce and 
contract and employment and then complaining when they were treated
like other commercial entities.  The objectors argued that the government 
had intruded into their private business.  The defenders argued that when
religion steps into the public sphere, it needs to play by the public’s rules.58 
Again, my aim is not to referee these claims.  Indeed, it seemed to me
throughout the run-up to Hobby Lobby that the case could be decided—as
boundary, and the place of injury should determine the law to be applied.”  Id. (footnote 
omitted).  Today, I am more uncertain on the question, but am inclined to think that, in the
calculation required by statutes such as RFRA, the government’s interest in vindicating
the rights of genuine third parties should generally be treated as potentially but not
invariably compelling. But cf. infra note 57 and accompanying text.  In addition, of course, 
as turned out to be dispositive in Hobby Lobby, the government action from which an 
exemption is sought must to satisfy the FRRA standard also “constitute the least restrictive 
means of serving” the government’s interest.  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759, 2761 
(citing 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(b) (2012)). 
57.	  I argue elsewhere that in cases such as Hobby Lobby, 
there is a genuine puzzle as to whether employees of religiously-affiliated
nonprofit enterprises and even religiously-committed for-profit firms are best
understood as “insiders” or “outsiders” to jurisdictional reach of the religious nomos, 
whether or not they are members of the religious community itself.  The proper
test, as in other jurisdictional contexts, is not consent (actual or implied) but a
more subtle and difficult metric of community, affiliation, and authority.
Dane, Scopes of Religious Exemption, supra note 43. 
58. Most of the language in this paragraph is taken, with minor changes, from my
short unpublished essay, Perry Dane, Doctrine and Deep Structure in the Contraceptive 
Mandate Debate (2013) (unpublished manuscript) http://ssrn.com/abstract=2296635 [https:// 
perma.cc/NX29-C4AF] [hereinafter Dane, Doctrine and Deep Structure].
 67












   
 
 




          
    
 
















it ultimately was—in more conventional retail terms and that the resort to 
categorical arguments on both sides of the mandate debate lent the dispute 
an apocalyptic air that was unnecessary and destructive.59  But my point
here, as before, is simply that such jurisdictional arguments—the effort to 
draw sharp boundaries between the domain of the religious community
and the domain of the state—are available in the context of exemptions as
well as that of institutional autonomy.60  For that matter, in cases such as 
Hobby Lobby, the two conversations can resonate so deeply as to become
rhetorical foils one for the other.  Thus, the government’s argument that
religiously-motivated for-profit corporations such as Hobby Lobby were, 
in effect, trying to break the proper bounds of religious jurisdiction embraced 
and even depended on the government’s willingness to grant actual churches 
a broad exemption.  The exemption for churches, the government argued,
served Hosanna-Tabor’s purpose of protecting religious institutional 
autonomy,61 even though the exemption was not actually an instance of 
religious institutional autonomy,62 while an exemption for for-profit firms 
would mark an unprecedented63 and unwise64 expansion of RFRA, even
 59. See id. The Court seemed to reaffirm its impatience with the most categorical
arguments on both sides of the contraceptive mandate debate more recently its per curiam
punt in Zubik v. Burwell, No. 14-1418, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 3047 (U.S. May 16, 2016). 
60. See also Angela C. Carmella, After Hobby Lobby: The “Religious For-Profit”
and the Limits of the Autonomy Doctrine, 80 MO. L. REV. 381, 385–86 (2015). 
61.	 The regulatory exemption for religious employers extends to “churches
and other houses of worship” and their integrated auxiliaries.  As the Seventh Circuit
explained, there is a long tradition of protecting the autonomy of a church through 
exemptions of this kind.  The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment give “‘special 
solicitude to the rights of religious organizations’ as religious organizations, 
respecting their autonomy to shape their own missions, conduct their own ministries, 
and generally govern themselves in accordance with their own doctrines as
religious institutions.” 
Brief for the Petitioners at 51–52, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 
(2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 173486 (citations omitted).  See also, id. at 20. 
62. Among other important differences is that these church exemptions from the 
contraceptive mandate were only available to organizations with religious objections to
contraceptive coverage.  45 C.F.R. 147.131(a). See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying
text (emphasizing that within its domain, institutional autonomy is present regardless of 
the specific religious beliefs of the organization asserting it).
63.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 61, at 16–18. 
64. Id. at 18–20.  As in the passage cited in note 61 supra, the government traded
on the distinction between institutional autonomy and broader exemptions: 
While Title VII’s exemption for religious employers burdens employees whose 
religion differs from that of their employer, Congress viewed that burden as a 
cost that was justified to protect “religious organizations[‘] . . . interest in autonomy
in ordering their internal affairs.”  That understanding is consistent with the First 
Amendment’s “special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”  By
contrast, neither this Court’s cases nor pre-RFRA federal employment statutes 
provided for-profit corporations an exemption from generally applicable law 
68
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though those firms also claimed to be legitimate sites of religious normativity.65 
Put another way, the government was trading on the pleasant illusion that 
the principle of a strictly-limited religious institutional autonomy is easy— 
though it is not—to undergird its effort to draw negative boundaries around
large classes of claims for religion-based exemptions. 
B. 
The different fates in our legal culture of religion-based exemptions and 
religious institutional autonomy cannot be rationalized simply by way of 
some a priori account of religious and state sovereignty.  But the two sets 
of problems do differ, at least in the American imagination, in how easily
they fit into the logic of constitutional rights and judicial review.
The key here, as I have argued elsewhere,66 is Justice Scalia’s observation 
in the majority opinion in Smith, which in turn reached back to a similar
observation in Reynolds v. United States,67 that a constitutionally guaranteed 
“private right to ignore generally applicable laws” is (with some exceptions)
not a “constitutional norm[]” but a “constitutional anomaly.”68  Specifically, 
religion-based exemptions are constitutionally anomalous in at least two
important respects.  First, while judicial review, including most as-applied 
judicial review, ordinarily identifies something inherently suspicious or 
defective in a statute or legal rule, the basic fact that religious commitments
can take any form whatsoever suggests that any statute or legal rule, however
generally reasonable and innocuous, could give rise to a claim for exemption.
Second, the assertion of constitutional rights does not generally depend
on the motivations of the claimant.  But claims to religion-based exemptions
turn at the outset entirely on the sincere commitments of religious claimants
on the premise that the corporation was exercising religion. There is no reason to
conclude that Congress intended RFRA to embody a fundamentally different 
understanding. 
Id. at 20 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
65. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents at 27–28, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 
134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 546899  (“[For-profit] corporations frequently
pursue moral or religious goals alongside profits . . . . Indeed Oklahoma, where Respondents
are incorporated, recognizes that general corporations may undertake any ‘lawful acts,’
including acts inspired by religious belief.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
66. Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, supra note 9, at 1723. 
67.  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1879). 
68.  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886 (1990). 
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and the direct conflict between those commitments and a given statute or
legal rule.69 
The doctrines of religious institutional autonomy, by contrast, are not
constitutionally anomalous.70  They provide general carve-outs from certain
laws or legal regimes and not others, and their assertion does not depend
on the specific religious commitments of particular churches or religious 
communities.71  “[R]eligious institutional autonomy is both narrower and 
broader than . . . religion-based exemptions.”72  But the net effect is to fit
much more comfortably into the standard assumptions about when and why 
specific rights can trump otherwise-applicable laws. 
Moreover, while Justice Scalia’s “anomaly” argument in Smith related 
specifically to the ordinary logic of constitutional review, it extends more 
generally into our normative intuitions about the rule of law, intuitions 
69. There is a third respect, which follows from the other two but which is less
relevant here, in which claims for religion-based exemptions are distinct: When religious 
believers seek an exemption from a given law, the appropriate question in a compelling
governmental interest analysis “is not whether the government has a strong enough interest 
in enforcing the law in general,” as it would be in other constitutional contexts, but
“whether it has a compelling interest in applying the law to religious dissenters. The compelling 
interest, that is to say, is measured at the margin and not in toto.”  Dane, Doctrine and 
Deep Structure, supra note 58, at 3–4 (footnote omitted). 
70. See Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, supra note 9, at 1732–36. 
71. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 
694, 709 (2012). 
The purpose of the [ministerial] exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision
to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason.  The exception
instead ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the
faithful—a matter “strictly ecclesiastical” is the church’s alone.
Id. (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94, 109 (1952)). The story is admittedly a bit more complicated with respect to
the church property prong of religious institutional autonomy. Thus, in the traditional
“polity” approach to resolving ecclesiastical property and organizational disputes, courts 
would defer to the locus of authority of the relevant religious community, but would first 
need to decide for themselves whether the community was organized hierarchically or
congregationally. And in the newer “neutral principles of law” approach, which Jones v. 
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 600–02 (1979) authorized as an alternative to polity approach, a 
court’s authority to look to “secular” documents such as deeds and trusts to resolve intra-
religious disputes is limited by the imperative not to interpret for itself questions of faith
or theology that might be contained in those documents.  See also Dane, “Omalous” 
Autonomy, supra note 9, at 1742 (arguing that the “neutral principles of law approach” is
best understood, not as a retreat from institutional autonomy but as a vehicle for allowing
churches “to resolve the meaning of autonomy for themselves through the instruments of
secular private ordering.”).  Nevertheless, while the precise shape or contour of autonomy 
in the church property context might well depend on the specific theological or ecclesiological 
commitments of the faith tradition in question, the existence of a right to autonomy does 
not. Autonomy doctrine, that is to say, never suggests that some religious groups are entitled
to a privilege to which others are not.  See id. at 1735. 
72. Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, supra note 9, at 1733. 
70
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invoked at various times by both conservatives and liberals and by both 
lawyers and other citizens.  As the Court put it Reynolds, in language that 
Justice Scalia cited in his own discussion of “constitutional anomaly,” a 
regime of religion-based exemptions risks permitting a religious dissenter
from simply becoming “a law unto himself,”73 contradicting not only
“constitutional tradition” but also “common sense.”74  Thus, when an 
intelligent commentator notes that there is something “unsettling about a 
conception of religious freedom that grants some people exemption from 
laws that others must obey,” he is tapping into a feeling that, however 
incomplete or even misguided it might be, runs deep.75  In fact, as the
juxtaposition between Justice Scalia’s opinion in Smith and the more 
recent controversy regarding the contraception mandate and religion-
based exemptions more generally make clear, it is a feeling that transcends 
the usual ideological divisions over both religion and constitutional law.76 
C. 
But that cannot be the end of the story.  To begin with, to admit that
religion-based exemptions are anomalous is not to concede that they are 
wrong.  Our constitutional and more general legal structure is entitled to 
include anomalies.  The compelling interest test announced in Sherbert did,
 73. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)). 
74. Id.
 75. Sanneh, supra note 35, at 20. 
76. A more cynical interpretation of the past few decades, to be sure, would be that 
for many across the ideological spectrum, general concern for either religious rights or the 
rule of law matters less than sympathy for specific results.  As one commentator has put it, 
There’s been an extraordinary reversal of ideological sides on the religious
accommodation issue . . . . Over the years we knew which side generally
progressives were on and which side conservatives were on—it was the opposite 
of the current side.  When peace churches wanted an exemption from war 
fighting, it was the progressive position that they should get it, and it was the 
conservative position to deny it. . . . 
While there has been some buyers’ regret on the one side, the conservatives who 
had opposed all these developments in religious accommodation at the time have
come to see some merit because it’s their own side whose ox is being gored. 
Religious Liberty and the Constitution: New Supreme Court Cases Discussed by a Panel 
of Experts at Columbia Law School, COLUM. L. SCH. (Nov. 23, 2015) (quoting Walter
Olson, Senior Fellow, Cato Institute Center for Constitutional Studies, Remarks at Religious 













   
  
        
 
 
   
       
    





   
 
  















   
 
after all, hold for almost thirty years.77  And RFRA remains on the books,
even if under siege. Justice Scalia’s trenchant indictment does suggest that 
supporters of religion-based exemptions bear a special burden to justify 
and make sense of them.  I happen to believe that this burden is met by
something like the sovereignty-based account of the relation of religion 
and state that I have outlined here.  Other arguments might do the trick as 
well. Thus, Justice Scalia’s challenge, however trenchant, should ideally
be the beginning of a conversation, not the end of it.
Another problem is that although our doctrines of religious institutional 
autonomy (in contrast to our doctrines of religion-based exemptions) are not 
“anomalous” in Justice Scalia’s sense of making “an individual’s obligation
to obey . . . a law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with [the individual’s]
religious beliefs,” it is not entirely clear why they turned out that way.78 
Indeed, at least some courts79 and commentators80 prior to the Supreme
Court’s resolution of the question in Hosanna-Tabor, did urge that the 
“ministerial exception” should only apply in the face of a specific religious 
objection to an otherwise generally applicable law.  So why did the general 
current of opinion, buttressed by even older currents in the church property
tradition of religious institutional autonomy, go the other way?  That is to say,
why did our doctrines of religious institutional autonomy evolve in a way
that effectively immunized them from Justice Scalia’s critique? 
Part of the answer might just be that religious institutional autonomy is
“omalous” because it can be. Recall the two ways in which religion-based
exemptions are “anomalous.”  First, any law whatsoever can give rise to
 77. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 139–40
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (“[I]t is still true that ‘[t]he
essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of 
the highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.’”
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)); 
[T]o agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad 
police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected 
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power 
of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability. 
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; Leahy v. District of Columbia, 833 F.2d 1046, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 
1987); Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121, 1126 (8th Cir. 1984); State v. Hershberger,
444 N.W.2d 282, 285–86 (Minn. 1989), vacated, 495 U.S. 901 (1990); Ware v. Valley
Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 426–27 (N.Y. 1989). 
78. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. 
79. See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 448 F.3d 615 (3d Cir. 2006), vacated on
grant of reh’g, 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006); Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin 
Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that lay teachers could bring an age 
discrimination complaint against a religious school unless the school could successfully
argue that it acted on the basis of a non-pretextual claimed “religious reason”).
80. See, e.g., Rutherford, supra note 49, at 1107–08; Elizabeth R. Pozolo, Note, 
One Step Forward, One Step Back: Why the Third Circuit Got It Right the First Time in
Petruska v. Gannon Univiversity, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 1093, 1117–18 (2008). 
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an exemption claim.  Second, exemption claims depend at the outset on a 
conflict between a law and an actual religious commitment or obligation. 
These two dimensions are not entirely independent.  A general exemptions 
regime must depend on conflicts with specific religious beliefs; to even 
imagine allowing religious believers to claim exemptions from any laws 
at all, whether or not the laws conflicted with the specific norms of their 
faith, would be both entirely anarchic and plain bizarre.  Thus, for example, 
that members of one particular religious group might have the right to
drink a sacramental tea laced with a psychedelic substance does not— 
could not—imply that all religious believers of any persuasion have the 
right to drink the same tea.81  Only the sort of regime of religious rights— 
such as religious institutional autonomy—that limits itself from the outset 
to carving out exceptions from a well-defined subset of laws can then in 
turn allow itself to provide those carve-outs, in wholesale fashion, to all 
religions.82 
That said, three other factors seem to be at work.  First, there are eminently 
practical reasons, including various line-drawing difficulties and problems of
proof, to recognize institutional autonomy across the board.83 
Second, an important force at work here is the very particular, and only 
imperfectly and sometimes arbitrarily realized, impulse in our legal culture to
treat religions the same even when it would be rational and sensible to
treat them differently. I have called this impulse a species of what I call
“analogy of dignity.”84  “Analogy of dignity,” in general, is a form of argument 
that extends a legal rule or institution to a new case, not because the logic 
81. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
423 (2006).
82. To be sure, the line I am drawing here between specific exemptions and more 
general carve-outs can be fuzzy.  Thus, for example, the traditional “sacramental wine” 
exception to various alcohol-regulating regimes, including federal Prohibition, see National
Prohibition Act, ch. 85, sec. 6, Pub. L. No. 66, 41 Stat. 305 (1919), were routinely written
to extend to the Jewish purchase and use of kosher wines, even though (1) when wine is 
called for in Jewish rituals, grape juice is in most instances a religiously permissible
substitute, (2) those rituals are in any event not “sacramental” in the Christian sense, and 
(3) perhaps most important, Jews purchase kosher wine, not only for use in specific ritual 
contexts, but also to drink at ordinary meals.  This was, I think, at least in a constrained
sense, an application of the impulse to “analogy of dignity” that I discuss infra at notes
84–88 and accompanying text. 
83. See Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV.
1, 51–57 (2011). 
84.  Perry Dane, Natural Law, Equality, and Same-Sex Marriage, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 
291, 330–50 (2014) [hereinafter Dane, Natural Law].
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of the rule or case requires it, but because something about “the status or
worth of the person or entity for whose benefit the paradigm rule or institution
is being extended” seems to call for it.85  “Arguments for analogy of dignity
thus have something to do with notions of equal worth, but they differ
substantially from the usual means-end rhetoric typically identified with 
constitutional ‘equal protection’ doctrine.”86 
In the context of religion, the impulse to “analogy of dignity” could not,
for the reasons I have just explained, possibly make any sense in the context 
of general regimes of religion-based exemptions such as RFRA or the pre-
Smith free exercise clause.  But it can and has come into play with respect
to certain specific aspects of religious liberty such as, for example, the
extension of the clergy-penitent privilege well beyond those faith traditions
that actually religiously mandate the secrecy of confession.87  It also appears
in more mundane contexts, as in the so-called “parsonage exemption,”
whose effect is to treat most clergy, regardless of their specific ecclesiastical 
traditions, as if they were required to live in church-provided housing.88 
And, as most relevant here, the impulse to respect analogy of dignity helps 
explain the general refusal, reaffirmed in Hosanna-Tabor, to condition 
religious institutional autonomy on the specific religious beliefs of a given 
church. 
A third explanation, though, goes more directly to the heart of the matter.
Sovereignty, within its domain, and particularly with respect to internal
affairs, tends toward the plenary.89  So if we take seriously the juridical
and not only the spiritual dignity of internal religious governance, it seems 
only natural not to limit it to some predetermined set of issues and concerns. 
And, if that renders the doctrines of religious institutional autonomy
constitutionally ordinary rather than anomalous, so much the better. 
Of course, there is a certain question-begging here.  Why has our legal 
culture taken seriously the juridical dignity of internal religious governance?
And what went awry in its consideration of religion-based exemptions? 
The discussion so far has made some progress.  But a mystery remains.
 85. Id. at 334. 
86. Id. (footnote omitted).
87. See id. at 343–44. 
88.  26 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).  See Dane, Natural Law, supra note 84, at 345–46. 
89. Cf. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 229 (“[S]overeignty of Congress, though 
limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects.”); Ole Spiermann, General
Legal Characteristics of States, in SOVEREIGNTY, STATEHOOD, AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY
144, 145–46 (Christine Chinkin & Freya Baetens eds., 2015) (in principle, states have 
“plenary competence” over their “internal affairs” (quoting JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION 
OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40–41 (2d ed. 2006))). I am, of course, citing these sources 
for their resonance rather than their direct authority.  Both state sovereignty and religious
sovereignty are far too complicated to be captured by a single word or simple slogan. 
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III. 
To proceed further, this Article now needs to shift gears.  It will deploy 
an additional dose of theory, that notion of double-coding to which I 
referred at the start.  But it will also turn toward narrative and even a bit 
of close reading, leavening normative analysis with a more descriptive 
account of roads taken and pathways missed.90 
A. 
Let’s begin by returning to the claim with which this Article began, that
a proper understanding of the legal relationship between religion and the 
state depends at some level on appreciating the jurisdictional, pluralist,
and dialogical nature of the encounter between the nomos of the state and
the nomos of religion.  That idea is part of a larger—much larger—commitment
to diversity, multivocality, and multidimensionality in our legal and more 
generally normative discourse.  Specifically, I want to propose now that
the legal imagination, at its best, will appreciate and even cultivate not
only the substantive multivocality of a diversity of legal authority, but also 
a methodological multivocality in the structure of legal argument itself.91 
90. 	 Narrative, of course, can itself be a normative craft.  As I have put it elsewhere,
central to law and the work of lawyers in all contexts is a subtle combination of
textual exegesis, the construction of powerful mythical historical narratives that 
articulate and motivate legal values, and the necessary if often imprecise work
of old-fashioned casuistry. Law, that is to say, including constitutional law, is at 
crucial points, a form of artificial reason, an artificial reason that both channels 
and shapes our fundamental commitments and actually helps make them real. 
And it is the hard craft of lawyering that makes all that possible.
Perry Dane, Judaism, Pluralism, and Constitutional Glare, 16 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIG. 282, 
290 (2015) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Dane, Judaism].
91. Cf. Dane, Maps, supra note 6, at 991: 
Sovereignty-talk, at its best, comprehends the willingness and the ability to hold,
in tandem, apparently contradictory images of the relationship between self and
other.  It is the ability to insist on absolute dominion, and yet also recognize the 
dominion of others, or to comprehend the possibility of equality even while also 
comprehending a relationship of hierarchy.  It is an exercise of craft—legal
craft—in which these different images all find their respective places and their 
appropriate contexts.  It is the epistemic courage to see that these images need 
not be reduced one to the other, or to some single compromise position that is 
unfaithful to them all.
 More generally,

pluralism comes with a good deal of tension, irony, and unresolved difficulties, 

but that, it seems to me, is part of its power and glory, and I would hate to be
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Legal reality can take a dual form, a superposition of the conventional and 
the subversive.  It is possible, for example, for a court to recognize the 
sovereignty of religious communities while also disavowing it.  And true 
legal wisdom can reside in understanding the relationship between such 
apparently divergent or even contradictory visions. 
That is what I mean by “double-coding.”  I borrow the term from some 
postmodern theorists,92 and have to fess up to a certain postmodern temptation
in my own use of it.93  But I do not really need such fancy machinery to 
without it. Pluralism, I should not need to emphasize, is not relativism or skepticism. 
But it is a recognition (and in some contexts a celebration) of multiplicity, 
complexity, perspective, humility, and the imperatives of encounter. 
Dane, Judaism, supra note 90, at 282. In constitutional and other legal debates at their best and
most honest, 
the process of dialogue, recognition, and mutual adjustment is complex, contradictory,
and often ironic. Sometimes, the encounter of normative discourses produces simply
intractable conflicts.  Sometimes there is no principled solution.  Sometimes, we just
need to make existential choices.
Id. at 289. 
92. The phrase, though by no means the idea, seems to have originated with Christopher
Jencks’s account of post-modernist architecture, in which modernist and traditional elements
are often combined in such a way that the design communicates different meanings to 
different audiences. See CHARLES JENCKS, WHAT IS POSTMODERNISM? 14–15 (Academy
Editions 1986).  See generally BRIAN MCHALE, THE CAMBRIDGE INTRODUCTION TO
POSTMODERNISM 67–81 (2015).  For discussions of “double-coding” in a variety of 
contexts, see, for example, HENRY BIAL, ACTING JEWISH: NEGOTIATING ETHNICITY ON THE
AMERICAN STAGE AND SCREEN (2005) (analysis of popular culture); BRIAN MCHALE,
POST-MODERNIST FICTION (Taylor & Francis 2004) (literary analysis); RAYMOND LESLIE
WILLIAMS, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY SPANISH AMERICAN NOVEL 199 (2003) (literary
analysis); EDITH WYSCHOGROD, SAINTS AND POSTMODERNISM: REVISIONING MORAL
PHILOSOPHY, at xxiii–xxiv (1990) (ethical theory); Loredana Di Martino, From Pirandello’s
Humor to Eco’s Double Coding: Ethics and Irony in Modernist and Postmodernist Italian 
Fiction, 126 MLN 137, 155 (2011); Achim Holter, Doppelte Optik and lange Ohren— 
Notes on the Aesthetic Compromise, in QUOTE, DOUBLE QUOTE: AESTHETICS BETWEEN 
HIGH AND POPULAR CULTURE 43, 44 (Paul Ferstl & Keyvan Sarkhosh eds., 2014); Tulasi 
Srinivas, Building Faith: Religious Pluralism, Pedagogical Urbanism, and Governance 
in the Sathya Sai Sacred City, 13 INT’L J. HINDU STUD. 301, 327 (2009) (religious and 
cultural history); Ravi Sundaram, Beyond the Nationalist Panopticon: The Experience of
Cyberpublics in India, in ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND TECHNOCULTURE 270, 282 (John 
Thornton Caldwell ed., 2000) (cultural history).  Similar observations about the superposition
of conventional and potentially subversive meanings in a single cultural expression have
become an important theme in scholarship about African-American art, music, and 
literature. See, e.g., HENRY LOUIS GATES, JR., THE SIGNIFYING MONKEY: A THEORY OF
AFRICAN-AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICISM, at xxv, 50–51, 110–13 (1988); DAVID M. LUBIN,
PICTURING A NATION: ART AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 123– 
24 (1994).
93. I have in mind, though, what has sometimes been called “constructive” 
postmodernism, which is not inherently relativistic, and which seeks to support structures
of thought rather than deconstruct them. See, e.g., DAVID RAY GRIFFIN ET AL., FOUNDERS
OF CONSTRUCTIVE POSTMODERN PHILOSOPHY: PEIRCE, JAMES, BERGSON, WHITEHEAD, AND
HARTSHORNE, at viii–ix (1993); MARTIN SCHIRALLI, CONSTRUCTIVE POSTMODERNISM:
76
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make the point.  Consider instead several analogies that, together, should 
help explain what I am getting it. The simplest, but also I think the 
least interesting, is simply the juxtaposition of a surface structure—which
is to say conventional legal doctrine—and its subterranean foundation in more
apparently radical ideas. A better comparison, though, is to one of the 
classic optical illusions, such as that of the vase and the faces,94 or the
duck and the rabbit,95 in which the trick is to recognize that the expression of
a change of aspect—from one image to the other—“is the expression of a
new perception and at the same time of the perception’s being unchanged.”96 
Yet another analogy might be to a stereoscopic photograph, in which
two images merge into a deeper picture than either one alone.97 
Perhaps the most pregnant, if still imperfect, analogy, though, is to C.S. 
Lewis’s account of transpositions, such as two-dimensional drawings of a 
TOWARD RENEWAL IN CULTURAL AND LITERARY STUDIES 3 (1999). See also Dane, Judaism, 
supra note 90. 
94. 
95. 
96. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 167 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 3d ed. 2001) (1953).  For a more technical but accessible account of these and other
optical illusions, see Donald D. Hoffman, The Interpretation of Visual Illusions, SCI. AM.,
Dec. 1983, at 95. 
97. See  DAVID BLEICH, THE DOUBLE PERSPECTIVE: LANGUAGE, LITERACY, AND 
SOCIAL RELATIONS 87 (1988) (discussing “cognitive stereoscopy” as a mental schema in
which the simultaneity of several perspectives produces a “cognitive depth perception”
that, among other things, integrates the “simultaneous sense of the separateness of others . . .
and the objectivity of oneself”). 
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three-dimensional world or a piano version of an orchestral composition.98 
The transposition is not merely a counterfeit.  It has integrity of its own. 
But our richest understanding of it requires that we also have some access 
to the higher form to which it is connected.  As Lewis explains, 
The piano version means one thing to the musician who knows the original
orchestral score and another thing to the man who hears it simply as a piano piece. 
But the second man would be at an even greater disadvantage if he had never heard
any instrument but a piano and even doubted the existence of such instruments.99 
Lewis emphasizes his point even more poignantly with a fable—clearly 
echoing Plato’s allegory of the cave in The Republic—of a child growing 
up in a dungeon whose only knowledge of the outside world comes from 
his mother’s pencil drawings.100  The boy is “dutiful” and “does his best 
to believe” his mother when she tells him that the 
outer world is far more interesting and glorious than anything in the dungeon.  At
times, he succeeds.  On the whole he gets on tolerably well until, one day, he says
something that gives his mother pause.  For a minute or two they are at cross-
purposes.  Finally, it dawns on her that he has, all these years, lived under
a misconception.  “But,” she gasps, “you didn’t think that the real world was full 
of lines drawn in lead pencil?”  “What?” says the boy. “No pencil marks there?”101 
The key here in invoking all these analogies is to uphold the legal 
imagination, which is to say the power of law as both a constructed reality
and a resonant reflection of reality.102  And it is to lament, when appropriate,
 98. See C.S. LEWIS, Transposition, in THE WEIGHT OF GLORY AND OTHER ADDRESSES
54, 60 (Walter Hooper ed., rev. ed.1980) (1949). Lewis develops his ideas in the context 
of a discussion of the relation between the natural and the supernatural.  My expropriation 
here makes no effort to do justice to his larger argument. 
99. Id. at 61.
 100. PLATO, REPUBLIC *514a-520a (C.D.C. Reeve trans., 2004). 
101. LEWIS, supra note 98, at 68. Lewis’s argument about transposition should, 
though, be amended (at least for my purposes) in one important respect: The phenomenon 
he identifies might be said to exist even when the so-called “higher” form arises out of the
lower rather than the other way around.  I recently heard the talented classical pianist Alexander
Gavrylyuk discuss his performances of Modest Mussorgsky’s “Pictures at an Exhibition.” 
Interestingly, Mussorgsky originally wrote “Pictures” as a piece for piano, and it was later 
composers, most famously Ravel, who composed the full orchestrations with which most
listeners are more familiar.  Yet Gavrylyuk emphasized that his familiarity with the orchestral
versions of the piece moved him to try, with the more “limited” resources of the piano, to 
achieve as much of the full dramatic potential of the piece as its later orchestrations
eventually revealed.  Alexander Gavrylyuk, Remarks at Chautauqua Symphony Orchestra’s 
Into the Music Series (July 7, 2015). 
102. In an earlier article, I similarly suggested that there are two aspects to the legal 
imagination. “The first aspect is the power of legal words to impart principle, to guide specific
decisions, to find in themselves reflections of fairness and justice.  The second aspect is
the power of legal words to create their own reality, to build a discourse not reducible to
any other.”  Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA
78
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our collective failure fully to appreciate the potential of the legal imagination.103 
Indeed, it takes no particularly fancy intellectual equipment merely to say 
of the legal imagination what a character in the play Six Degrees of Separation
said of imagination more generally:
The imagination [is] . . . our most personal link, with our inner lives and the world 
outside that world—this world we share. . . .  I believe that the imagination is the 
passport we create to take us into the real world.  I believe that the imagination is
another phrase for what is most uniquely us.104 
L. REV. 1, 133 (1994) [hereinafter Dane, Jurisdictionality]. And I suggested a deep connection
between these two aspects:
To believe in a distinctive legal reality is to posit a world of words, a field of 
vision—a web of truth—that can stand up to other forms of truth.  To believe in 
the power of words to impart principle and guide decisions is to posit that the 
legal web is also of a piece, that it can support and inform each of its parts.  It is 
to believe that, strengthened by those internal connections, legal truth can, in its 
own way, assimilate standards of justice and rationality that are embedded in the
wider human conversation.
Id. at 134.  Similar concerns have animated much of my scholarship.  See, e.g., Perry Dane,
Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191, 1193 (1987) [hereinafter
Dane, Vestedness]; Perry Dane, Sovereign Dignity and Glorious Chaos: A Comment on 
the Interjurisdictional Implications of the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J.
173, 174 (1996); Perry Dane, The Corporation Sole and the Encounter of Law and Church, 
in SACRED COMPANIES: ORGANIZATIONAL ASPECTS OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS 
OF ORGANIZATIONS 50, 50–51 (N.J. Demerath III et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter Dane, 
Corporation Sole]; Perry Dane, The Public, the Private, and The Sacred: Variations on a
Theme of Nomos and Narrative, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 15, 16 (1996) [hereinafter 
Dane, The Public, the Private, and The Sacred]; Dane, Maps, supra note 6, at 963; Dane, 
Natural Law, Equality, and Same-Sex Marriage, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 291, 374–75 (2014). 
103. For a similar project, consider JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION:
AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990), in which Professor White, after a 
close and rich reading of a series of cases, concludes that in too many of them “we have
seen instance after instance in which a Justice has found ways to avoid the difficulties of
judging by turning to false grounds of authority,” failing to recognize that judicial authority
“must be created rhetorically, in the opinion itself; that it depends upon the informed
understanding of the reader and upon his acquiescence, not in the ‘result’ or even the 
‘reasoning’ by which the result is reached, but in the set of relations and activities created 
in the opinion itself.” Id. at 216–17.  For an intriguing argument about how the legal 
modernist aversion to “legal fictions” obscures the inherent role that fiction and imaginative 
construction plays in legal reasoning, see Mark A. Clawson, Note, Prescription Adrift in 
a Sea of Servitudes: Postmodernism and the Lost Grant, 43 DUKE L.J. 845 (1994).  Clawson 
rightly suggests that a modern legal world that “cannot admit its fiction” has locked itself
in a “prison of the mind.” Id. at 878. 
104. JOHN GUARE, SIX DEGREES OF SEPARATION 22 (play, 3d ed. 2010). Guare’s
character thus complains that
 79
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And, indeed, that these words are spoken by a character whose own 
genuineness and identity is the preoccupying puzzle of the play only confirms
for me that the faculty of the imagination is central to making sense of the 
act of encounter, and trying to assimilate the world-creating efforts of
others into the picture we construct of the legal world we inhabit.105 
B. 
The power of the legal imagination and the particular possibility of 
“double-coding” are germane throughout legal discourse.  But they are 
particularly vital in understanding the relationship of religion and the state. 
The reason is that any legal system is inherently prone to solipsism.106 
Allowing into the surface layers of legal doctrine the juridical dignity of 
a radically different type of sovereign authority is not impossible—it has 
even been done—but it is difficult.  Better in some sense to leave the 
jurisdictional, legal pluralist, and dialogical principle below the surface, 
and speak explicitly through more domesticated doctrines.  Moreover, for
some of the reasons I have already discussed, the deep jurisdictional, legal
pluralist, and dialogical principle is not very determinate in any event. More
conventional legal language is necessary, if nothing else, to mediate between
The imagination has been so debased that imagination—being imaginative—
rather than being the linch-pin of our existence now stands as a synonym for
something outside ourselves like science fiction or some new use for tangerine 
slices on raw pork chops—what an imaginative summer recipe—and Star Wars! 
So imaginative!
Id. In writing this piece of dialogue, Guare undoubtedly had in mind the classical
philosophical tradition that treats the “imagination” as a powerful and crucial faculty of
human thought. See generally Anthony R. Manser, Imagination, in 4 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY 136, 136–39 (Paul Edwards et al. eds., 1967).  Recent work I have found 
particularly evocative includes G.B. MADISON, The Philosophical Centrality of the Imagination:
A Postmodern Approach, in THE HERMENEUTICS OF POSTMODERNITY 178 (G.B. Madison
ed., 1988); MARY WARNOCK, IMAGINATION AND TIME (1994); Linda Meyer, Between 
Reason and Power: Experiencing Legal Truth, 67 U. CINN. L. REV. 727 (1999). 
105. 	 Consider this exchange near the end of the play: 
OUISA: I read today that a young man committed suicide in Riker’s Island. . . . 
Was it Paul?  Who are you?  We never found out who you are. 
FLAN: I’m sure it’s not him.  He’ll be back.  We haven’t heard the last of him. 
The imagination.  He’ll find a way.
GUARE, supra note 104, at 70. 
106. See Dane, Intersecting Worlds, supra note 9, at 404 (“[T]he impulse to
appreciating legal pluralism arises, not merely out of theoretical commitments, but out of
a process of existential encounter, as each normative system asks itself precisely what is 
going on outside the reach of its most solipsistic concerns.”); Perry Dane, The Battlefields 
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the deep principle and the particular questions that arise in actual cases
and real contexts. 
For double-coding to work, however, two conditions must be met. First,
the law and the judges who speak for the law must be willing, consciously
and explicitly or not, to appreciate the multivocal deep structure of the legal
materials.  They must, that is to say, be willing to read between the lines,
to draw otherwise debatable inferences, and to make connections that might 
not be immediately obvious.  Second, the surface doctrine must at least resonate 
with, even if it does not fully capture, the deeper layers of meaning.  The
vase and the faces, or the piano and orchestral arrangements, that is to say, 
though they remain distinct, must somehow fit together. 
Part of the problem in the development of the American doctrine of
religion and law, particularly with respect to free exercise, is that these
two conditions were not met.  That is a purely contingent fact of history. 
It might easily have been otherwise.  And, even if it had been otherwise,
other factors and other forces might have intervened.  But at least one part
of the answer to the puzzle with which I began—the disjunction between
free exercise and religious institutional autonomy—can be found in these 
failures of imagination. 
C. 
In the broader sweep of things, the story of religious institutional 
autonomy in American constitutional doctrine is relatively straightforward. 
And it is as clear an example as one might hope for of double-coding at 
its best. 
From the start, explicit sovereignty talk has always been close to the 
surface in the institutional autonomy context.107  That might be partly
 107. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132
S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (“internal governance of the church”); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese 
v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976) (“civil courts are bound to accept the decisions 
of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of
discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.”); Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 728–729 (1872) (affirming “right to organize voluntary religious 
associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to 
create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association,
and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and 
officers within the general association”); Crowder v. S. Baptist Convention, 828 F.2d 718, 
727 (11th Cir. 1987) (“ecclesiastical government”); Smith v. Bd. of Pensions of Methodist 
Church, 54 F. Supp. 224, 236 (E.D. Mo. 1944) (discussing relationship of “church courts”
to “civil courts”); Marsh v. Johnson, 82 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Ky. 1935) (“In such matters 
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because, from the point of view of secular judges, formal religious authority
structures just look more like quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial phenomena 
than the court of religious conscience at the heart of free exercise claims.
It might also be partly because the constitutional doctrine’s religious 
institutional autonomy grew almost seamlessly out of a rich, though by no 
means uniform, sub-constitutional common law tradition.  Those common
law origins are sometimes considered incidental or awkward, but they
clearly gave courts a vocabulary, freedom, and a set of principles that 
might otherwise not have been available.108 
Equally significant to the power of our jurisprudence of religious 
institutional autonomy, however, is that even if it has not fully committed 
itself to “sovereignty-talk,” the double-coding in which it has engaged has 
been particularly fruitful.  Thus, when Justice Blackmun, in Jones v. 
Wolf,109 brought to bear norms of private ordering as one way to resolve 
internal church disputes, the case—correctly understood110—also suggested 
that a church’s power to translate its own ecclesiastic doctrines into secular 
language had to be read much more generously than the constrained right 
to private ordering that might be available to individuals.  And when some 
of the litigants in the Hosanna-Tabor litigation argued for an understanding
of the so-called ministerial exception that reduced it to a right of freedom
of association, the Court could reject such a doctrinal reduction of 
religious institutional autonomy while not explicitly rejecting the broader 
thematic comparison entirely.111  Indeed, the extra space between freedom
relating to the faith and practice of the church and its members, the decision of the church
court is not only supreme, but is wholly without the sphere of legal or secular judicial 
inquiry.”). 
108. See generally Bernard Roberts (Trujillo), Note, The Common Law Sovereignty
of Religious Lawfinders and the Free Exercise Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 211 (1991).  That 
common law history also helped avoid the problem of “constitutional glare” that, as I will
discuss in more detail infra, has so bedeviled the consideration of religion-based exemptions.
See infra Part D.2. 
109. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603–04 (1979) (“[T]he neutral-principles analysis 
shares the peculiar genius of private law systems in general—flexibility in ordering private 
rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.  Through appropriate [legal 
instruments] . . . . a religious organization can ensure that a dispute over the ownership of
church property will be resolved in accord with the desires of the members.”) 
110.  I elaborate on this argument in Dane, Intersecting Worlds, supra note 9. 
111. 	Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 705–06. 
The right to freedom of association is a right enjoyed by religious and secular
groups alike.  It follows under the EEOC’s and Perich’s view that the First
Amendment analysis should be the same, whether the association in question is 
the Lutheran Church, a labor union, or a social club.  That result is hard to square
with the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the
rights of religious organizations.  We cannot accept the remarkable view that the 
Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s freedom 
to select its own ministers. 
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of association and genuinely robust institutional autonomy, just like the 
extra space between private ordering and such robust autonomy, is
ambiguous and complicated enough that a certain implicit degree of 
double-coding remains part of the conversation.112 
D. 
The story of religion-based exemptions in American law is much more
complicated, difficult, and contentious.  For my purposes here, I will focus
on only a few cases.  I will begin with the two bookend cases—Reynolds
and Smith—that rejected the very idea of a general regime of religion-
based exemptions from otherwise-applicable, neutral laws as inconsistent
with the bedrock assumptions of the rule of law and constitutional 
adjudication. Then I will discuss Sherbert, the intervening decision that 
tried—ultimately unsuccessfully—to set in place precisely such a regime 
of religion-based exemptions, and Justice Souter’s concurrence in Church
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, which tried—valiantly
but too late—to fix Sherbert’s mistake.113 
1.
Reynolds, which upheld the criminal prosecution of a Utah Mormon
polygamist against a constitutional challenge, could have—perhaps only
in a different world—been treated as a religious institutional autonomy
case. After all, George Reynolds was not charged with fornication or 
another sexual crime, but with bigamy.114 And the awkward fact is that
Reynolds only married his second wife in a religious ceremony, and did 
not seek any purely civil recognition of that marriage.115 
Id. at 706 (citation omitted).
112. See generally Richard Schragger & Micah J. Schwartzman, Against Religious 
Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013). 
113. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559–
77 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring).
114.  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161–68 (1878). 
115. Id. at 167.  I do not want to suggest that this should necessarily have changed
the outcome. Even under contemporary law, “purely religious” marriages can have civil 
consequences, both good and bad. See Perry Dane, A Holy Secular Institution, 58 EMORY 
L.J. 1123, 1159–68 (2009). But cf. Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1234 (D. 
Utah 2013) (striking down on various constitutional grounds Utah’s current statute that 
was interpreted to prohibit even unlicensed solemnized “bigamous” marriages), remanded 
on other grounds with instructions to vacate judgment and dismiss action, 2016 U.S. App. 
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But Reynolds was not decided in a different world.  In our world, the
case needs to be understood in the context of the fierce effort to eradicate 
what many in the nation felt to be the immoral and oppressive behavior of 
a dangerous and rebellious sect.116  Moreover, marriage was a particularly 
fraught issue, since church and state had been fighting and negotiating 
over its regulation for many centuries.  And so the Court almost could not 
help but understand the case as being not about a religious right to be left 
alone, but about the rule of law in a democratic state.  And so it held that 
to “permit” the sought exemption “would be to make the professed doctrines 
of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect, to permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself.  Government could exist only 
in name under such circumstances.”117 
2.
But what about Smith, which virtually put an end to a short experiment 
with free exercise exemptions in the context of much more sympathetic
claimants, and the availability of the compelling interest test that could
have denied the exemption on much narrower grounds?118 
As I have already emphasized, Justice Scalia was correct that religion-
based exemptions of the sort possible under the then-governing regime of 
Sherbert v. Verner were a “constitutional anomaly.”119  But that need not 
have been the end of the matter.  Religion-based exemptions might be a
“constitutional anomaly.”  Nevertheless, the appearance of anomaly sometimes 
dissolves in the light of a different, and more generous, frame of reference.120 
LEXIS 6571 (10th Cir. Utah Apr. 11, 2016) (holding that case became moot in the light
of county attorney’s announced policy only to prosecute bigamy in limited circumstances). 
For my discussion of the original district court opinion, see Perry Dane, The Polygamy 
(aka “Religious Cohabitation”) Decision, CTR. FOR L. & RELIGION F. AT ST. JOHN’S U.
SCH. OF L. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://clrforum.org/2013/12/16/polygamy/ [https://perma.cc/ 
YV7H-7MYC].
116. See generally SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (Thomas A. Green & 
Hendrik Hartog eds., Univ. of  N.C. Press 2002). 
117. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167. 
118. Cf. Emp’t Div.. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 903–07 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment) (concluding that allowing religious claimants an exemption from state
drug laws would “seriously impair Oregon’s compelling interest in prohibiting possession
of peyote by its citizens.”)
119. Id. at 886. 
120. “We compensate, we reconcile, we balance. We are enabled to unite into a
consistent whole the various anomalies and contending principles that are found in the 
minds and affairs of men.”  EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
AND ON THE PROCEEDINGS IN CERTAIN SOCIETIES IN LONDON RELATIVE TO THAT EVENT 281
(C. O’Brien ed. 1969). 
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To begin with, religion-based exemptions might be “constitutionally 
anomalous.”  But they are not completely legally anomalous.  Justice Scalia
might have looked for parallels, not in the standard norms of individual
liberty rights found elsewhere in the Bill of Rights, but to other sources. 
He might have considered the Establishment Clause, in either its more
separationist or more accommodationist readings, as suggesting the wholesale
framework to which the retail exceptions of free exercise are a partial 
corrective.121  He might have looked further afield, to conventional choice
of law doctrine or even to the full faith and credit clause, as a touchstone.122 
He might have plumbed the larger power in the forms of religion-based
exemptions that he was willing to consider—exemptions claimed in the 
face of laws that were not neutral or generally applicable, or those arising
out of what have to be called “hybrid” claims.  He might have considered
the long history of legislatively-granted exemptions as shedding light on
the sorts of legal values that might also be instantiated in the free exercise
clause.123 
Or Justice Scalia might have considered more fully the body of cases 
on religious institutional autonomy that he explicitly upheld even as he
effectively negated Sherbert. As I have emphasized, those cases present
a bit of a mystery themselves, to which I will need to return.  Nevertheless,
a more sympathetic analysis might have found in institutional autonomy,
and in the larger historical and legal context out of which it arose, some 
friendly support for a more vigorously understood free exercise jurisprudence. 
Would all this require a full-throated commitment, or capitulation, to
the jurisdictional, legal pluralist, and dialogical principle?  The way I have 
put it here, perhaps. But more domesticated, rough-edged, and jerry-rigged 
comparisons and connections might have been found.
That Scalia and the Court’s majority did not see such possibilities was 
largely a matter of ideology and what would have been thought of at the 
time as judicial conservatism—though that characterization seems almost 
quaint now. But also at fault, to what extent I will not try to measure, was 
a cognitive prejudice in Scalia’s and the Court’s understanding of
constitutional law. 
121. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
 122. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
123. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding
of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990). 
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In an earlier a
 
That bit of blindness 
rticle, I discussed the te




have called “constitutional glare.”  
to assume that the truly important, truly intense locus of values in our legal culture
can only be found in the Constitution.  There is much talk in the legal academy 
of “constitutional fate” and “constitutional faith.” . . . But too little notice is paid
to the prevalence of “constitutional glare,” the tendency of constitutional talk to
obstruct the normative work done by the rest of law, and to obscure the degree to
which constitutional law itself is embedded in larger narratives and traditions.124 
In that article, and elsewhere,125 I focused on the aspect of constitutional
glare that blinds us to the importance and interest of sub-constitutional, 
nitty-gritty questions in the relation of religion to secular law.126  Here,  
though, I want to suggest a related effect of constitutional glare: the tendency
to see constitutional law itself as a specially constructed analytic machine,
whose fundamental theoretical infrastructure is self-contained and unique.127 
This illusion that constitutional law is or should be self-contained cuts off 
points of imaginative connection between constitutional doctrine and the 
124. Dane, The Public, the Private, and The Sacred, supra note 102, at 21 (footnotes
omitted).
125. See, e.g., Dane, Jurisdictionality, supra note 102, at 122–23; Dane, Corporation
Sole, supra note 102, at 51–53, 55–57; Perry Dane, Natural Law, Equality, and Same-Sex 
Marriage, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 291 (2014); Dane, Judaism, supra note 90, at 286–89. 
126. 	 Constitutional doctrine, after all, is necessarily self-referential, even
solipsistic. It is about  what government can and cannot do, or what it must and
must not do. . . .  None of this is meant as a criticism of the Constitution, or of 
constitutional discourse.  It would only be so if the Constitution were all of law,
or even the only transcendently significant law.  But the Constitution is neither 
of these, and it is only constitutional glare that makes us think it might be.
Dane, The Public, the Private, and The Sacred, supra note 102, at 26.  Notice again the
reference to solipsism—here not the solipsism of the state confronting other legal orders 
but the solipsism of constitutional law confronting the rest of law.
127. It might seem odd that I am accusing Justice Scalia, of all the members of the 
Court, of suffering from “constitutional glare.” But, to avoid such glare, it is not enough, 
or even satisfactory, to suggest, as Scalia often does, that legal tradition can fix the meaning of
constitutional rights.  See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736 
(2011); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Gasperini v.
Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 448–61 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Montana 
v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43–51 (1996) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); Pac. Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 24–40 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Burnham v. Super. Ct., 
495 U.S. 604, 622–28 (1990) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 
U.S. 110, 121–24 (1989) (Scalia, J.). See also J. Richard Broughton, The Jurisprudence
of Tradition and Justice Scalia’s Unwritten Constitution, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 19 (2000); 
Gregory P. Magarian, The Marrow of Tradition: the Roberts Court and Categorical First 
Amendment Speech Exclusions, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1339, 1350–51, 1355–57 (2015). 
Completely escaping the effect of constitutional glare would require recognizing a more
dynamic and evocatively rich connection between the Constitution and the rest of the legal
landscape. Cf. JAROSLAV PELIKAN, THE VINDICATION OF TRADITION 65 (Yale Univ. Press 
1984) (“Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the
living.”).
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rest of law. Thus, Scalia could only think of comparing religion-based 
exemptions to other constitutional rights, and did not trouble to wonder 
whether there might be other frames of reference by whose measure such
exemptions might seem less “anomalous.” Indeed, this aspect of constitutional
glare even makes it more difficult to draw connections within constitutional 
doctrine—such as the connection between religion-based exemptions and 
institutional autonomy—by closing off access to the overarching categories 
or metaphors that would make those connections intelligible. And, as I
discussed above, Scalia’s argument has then had the paradoxical effect— 
though one still consistent with the pernicious effects of constitutional 
glare—to reach out beyond the realm of purely constitutional logic to our 
more general legal normative intuitions.128 
3.
It would be unfair, however, only to blame the Smith Court in 1990 for 
being blinded by “constitutional glare” and failing to see that religion-
based exemptions could best be understood, not by reference to typical 
constitutional analysis, but by some richer and deeper set of arguments.
For, in fact, Smith only brought to the surface a gap that had plagued the 
Court’s religion-exemption cases from their start in Sherbert. For those 
cases never admitted, let alone tried to make sense of, the constitutionally 
“anomalous” character of the free exercise doctrine they were propounding. 
And while it would be ascribing too much force to mere argument to 
suggest that Smith would have come out the other way had those earlier 
cases been more forthright, coherent, and convincing, Scalia and the rest
of his majority would at least have had a harder time tearing down the 
edifice.
Of the cases that established and defined the modern pre-Smith doctrine 
of religion-based exemptions, none was as important, or as blind to the
“anomaly” challenge, as the first in the series, Sherbert, written by Justice 
William Brennan.  Indeed, Sherbert’s failure is, in some ways, a more deeply 
emblematic part of the story than Smith’s failure. 
The legal discussion in Sherbert included a brief review of prior law. 
Free exercise law before Sherbert had traversed a muddy path.129  Brennan’s
 128. Supra Section II.B.
129. As discussed earlier, Reynolds v. United States, the first significant free exercise
case, had rejected the notion of religion-based exemptions, warning that they would “permit 
every citizen to become a law unto himself.”  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166– 
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opinion, however, put the best possible spin on it.130  His masterful
rereading of precedent was not as outrageous as Scalia’s in Smith, though 
an observer could be forgiven for thinking that they deserved each other. 
More important than Justice Brennan’s reading of history, however, 
was his framing of the basic question. Tellingly, he subtly downplayed 
the recognition of genuine conflict of normative authority between religion 
and state that had led the Reynolds Court to its conclusion that to allow a
religion-based exemption would “permit every citizen to become a law 
67 (1878).  The Reynolds Court also asserted, in what by any account would be an 
oversimplification, that “[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they
cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.” Id. at
166.  By the 1930’s, however, the Court had in Cantwell v. Connecticut, taken some of the 
edge off Reynolds’s purported distinction between belief and action. Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940). The Free Exercise Clause, Cantwell declared, “embraces
two concepts, —freedom to believe and freedom to act.  The first is absolute but, in the 
nature of things, the second cannot be.”  Id. Cantwell upheld the right of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
to proselytize and solicit contributions on public streets. Id. at 300, 310.  It and its direct 
progeny, however, including Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 106–07, 116–17 
(1943) (striking down, as applied to religious proselytizers, ordinance imposing flat tax on
privilege of canvassing or soliciting in a municipality); and Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 
573, 576–78 (1944) (striking down, as applied to evangelist who sold religious books door-
to-door, ordinance imposing flat license tax on book agents); and Fowler v. Rhode Island, 
345 U.S. 67, 67, 70 (1953) (striking down ordinance prohibiting religious or political
meetings in public parks), were not genuine cases of religion-based exemptions, for
two connected reasons.  First, the religious rights involved overlapped, perhaps completely, 
with rights of free speech, press, or association. Second, and more to the point, the rights 
that these cases vindicated did not depend on the particular religious beliefs of the persons 
asserting the rights—they were, in short, about the typical stuff of defining a constitutionally
protected general zone of liberty.  Meanwhile, in several other cases, the Court expressly
rejected claims for true religion-based exemptions. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 600–02, 609 (1961) (rejecting a religious-based exemption for Sunday closing
laws); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944) (rejecting allowing religious-based 
exemptions for child labor); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38–39 (1905) (rejecting 
religious- based exemptions for immunization in consideration of public health and safety). 
Braunfeld is particularly interesting here, both because Brennan’s dissent in that case
presaged his majority opinion in Sherbert, and because the case, involving as it did an 
“indirect” clash between religion and secular law, would probably have come out the same 
way even under the Court’s post-Sherbert, pre-Smith, doctrine.
 130. 	The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any
governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such, Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303. 
On the other hand, the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise 
Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious 
beliefs or principles, for “even when the action is in accord with one’s religious
convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions.”  Braunfeld, 366
U.S. at 603.  The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some 
substantial threat to public safety, peace, or order. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United 
States, 329 U.S. 14, 19 (1946); Prince, 321 U.S. at 171; Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 
39; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 168. 
Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1962). 
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unto himself.”131  Thus, while the Reynolds Court referred to George Reynolds’ 
sense of “religious duty,”132 Justice Brennan in Sherbert simply referred
to Adele Sherbert’s religious “precepts”133 and religious “practice”134 and her 
“conscientious objection”135 to the requirement of the state’s unemployment 
compensation law. 
By itself, of course, the reticence of the language in Sherbert would not
necessarily be consequential, though the contrast with similar discussions 
in both earlier and later cases is striking.136  The crucial doctrinal step in the
opinion, however, appears in the paragraph that directly follows Justice
Brennan’s review of the free exercise law: 
Plainly enough, appellant’s conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes 
no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state 
legislation.  If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to
withstand appellant’s constitutional challenge, it must be either because her
disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her
constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free
exercise of appellant’s religion may be justified by a ‘compelling state interest in
the regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate . . .’
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438.137 
The key to this paragraph is the citation to NAACP v. Button. Button
was a First Amendment speech case decided only five months before
Sherbert. It struck down state restrictions on legal solicitation, as applied
to organizations like the NAACP that engaged in litigation as an 
instrument of “political expression.”138  Thus, having spent the potential
of the free exercise cases, Brennan broadened his perspective to the rest
of the First Amendment.  The import of this move was to suggest that the 
problem of religion-based exemptions was only an example of the broader
principle that the government could not infringe on a First Amendment 
131. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 153, 167. 
132. Id. at 162. 
133. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. 
134. Id. at 403–04. 
135. Id. at 403. 
136. The Sherbert opinion did recognize that the State was forcing Adele Sherbert
“to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the
one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on 
the other hand.” Id. at 404.  And Justice Brennan did eventually come around to speaking
more explicitly about “religious duty.”  See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 514
(1986) (Brenann, J., dissenting). 
137. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403. 
138. Button, 371 U.S. at 429. 
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liberty without a “compelling interest.”  Indeed, the opinion returned to
free speech precedents at subsequent crucial points, in spelling out the
stringency of the “compelling interest” test139 and in insisting that even an
otherwise compelling interest could not justify an infringement unless 
there were “no alternative forms of regulation.”140 
Sherbert’s assimilation of religion-based exemption claims into standard 
First Amendment doctrine was a deft rhetorical move.  Building on the
opinion’s more general rhetorical reticence about the very nature of the 
problem at hand, it domesticated religion-based exemptions, rendering 
them a normal product of constitutional analysis.  Indeed, this move was 
so deft that the Resolution of the Supreme Court Bar memorializing Justice
Brennan could, with real admiration and no trace of irony, find in Sherbert
the perfect segue from speech to religion in the Justice’s jurisprudence:
“Justice Brennan treated religious freedom as an integral aspect of his First
Amendment vision.  In Sherbert v. Verner, . . . he laid the foundation for 
modern protection of the free exercise of religion by requiring government 
to establish a compelling interest before interfering with religious 
conscience.”141  More important, Sherbert’s rhetoric was so deft that, in 
Smith itself, Justice O’Connor’s opinion demurring from the Court’s
rejection of the compelling interest test could invoke free speech law to 
try to refute the claim that religion-based exemptions were “anomalous.”142
 139. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
Thomas was a free speech and free assembly case striking down state restraints on union 
organizing, for the proposition that “[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount 
interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.”  Thomas, 323 U.S. at 530
 140. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407–08.  The opinion supported this proposition with 
four unadorned citations preceded by a “Cf.” Id. Each of the cases in the list was decided 
squarely on free speech, free press, or free association—and not free exercise—grounds,
though one of them (Struthers) arose in the context of religious proselytizing. See Shelton
v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 480, 490 (1960) (striking down requirement that public school
teachers disclose organizations to which they belonged or contributed); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (striking down ordinance forbidding distribution of any
handbill that did not include the name and address of the person who prepared, distributed, 
or sponsored it); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 141–42, 149 (1943) (striking down 
ordinance forbidding any person from knocking on doors or ringing doorbells to distribute 
handbills or circulars); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (striking down ordinances
forbidding distribution of literature on streets or other public places). 
141. Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in Memory of Justice
Brennan, 523 U.S. v–xlix, xxix (1998). 
142. 	  Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901–02. 
The Court today gives no convincing reason to depart from settled First Amendment 
jurisprudence. There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability
or general criminal prohibitions, for laws neutral toward religion can coerce a
person to violate his religious conscience or intrude upon his religious duties 
just as effectively as laws aimed at religion.  Although the Court suggests that 
the compelling interest test, as applied to generally applicable laws, would result
90
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But the slide from free speech doctrine to a defense of religion-based 
exemptions was, in fact, misguided.143  The intellectual foundation established
for exemptions doctrine was therefore brittle from the start.144  And while,
as noted, it might accord too much weight to the intellectual force of 
precedent to suggest that this is why a majority in Smith finally came to 
reject religion-based exemptions, the hole in the heart of the doctrine
made their task that much easier.
The next question then becomes why Brennan wrote Sherbert the way 
he did. Too much intellectualizing would again be a mistake.  Part of the 
reason was surely that looking to established free speech precedents was
the path of least resistance.  Moreover, Sherbert needs to be understood 
in the context of a general tendency in the legal and academic culture of 
the time, and perhaps still, to treat free speech as the paradigmatic First 
in a “constitutional anomaly,” ante, at 886, the First Amendment unequivocally
makes freedom of religion, like freedom from race discrimination and freedom 
of speech, a “constitutional nor[m],” not an “anomaly.” Ibid. . . . As the language of
the Clause itself makes clear, an individual’s free exercise of religion is a
preferred constitutional activity. . . . A law that makes criminal such an activity
therefore triggers constitutional concern–and heightened judicial scrutiny—
even if it does not target the particular religious conduct at issue.  Our free speech 
cases similarly recognize that neutral regulations that affect free speech values 
are subject to a balancing, rather than categorical, approach. See, e.g., United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 
475 U.S. 41, 46–47 (1986); cf. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 792–94 
(1983) (generally applicable laws may impinge on free association concerns). 
Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
143. Indeed, one need look no further than Button itself to make the point. Button
was decided before O’Brien, which first fully articulated the notion of expressive conduct. 
See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.  Therefore, the first challenge in Button, 
which Brennan’s opinion met with force and flair, was to demonstrate that, under anything 
but the “narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly,” the
litigation activity in which the NAACP engaged was a form of protected political
expression and association. Button, 371 U.S. at 430.  The Court did not do this by looking 
merely to the subjective convictions of the NAACP itself, or by carving out an exemption 
that applied only to organizations with similar convictions.  Rather, it decided, as a matter 
of history and objective social fact, that litigation was on a par with political campaigning
as a means of spreading an ideological message and effecting social change. See id. at 
429–31. 
144. Even some contemporary commentators noticed the shallowness of the opinion. 
See  JAMES E. CLAYTON, THE MAKING OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT IN ACTION 284 
(1964) (claiming that the Sherbert opinion, unlike Justice Brennan’s landmark concurrence in
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), “left conspicuous holes”), 
quoted in SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 174 
(2010). Cf. id. (“his Schempp concurrence was uniquely Brennan’s own.”)
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Amendment right to which consideration of questions of religious liberty 
was at best a poor relation.145 
Nevertheless, I want to venture one more explanation: Justice Brennan’s 
views on freedom of speech and freedom of religion genuinely were
instantiations of a single constitutional conviction. One sympathetic antagonist 
has said: 
No justice, with the exception of John Marshall, has made as large a mark on the 
law of this country as William Brennan.  It is not just through his length of service 
but through the coherence and distinctiveness of the vision that he imposed over 
those years in a large array of apparently disparate fields of law: speech, religion, 
equal protection, criminal procedure, federal jurisdiction, statutory interpretation. . . . 
[Brennan] had a clear and comprehensive conception of what our society should
be. . . .  His vision was that of an open, democratic, society, with no great
disparities of wealth or power, where there was little privilege and only that
suffering and deprivation that organized social effort could not remove.  Government 
power should be restrained, modest, limited—except where, in the pursuit of
equality or the alleviation of suffering, government responds to significant accumulations
of private power.146 
Another commentator—a former clerk—has even more extravagantly
described Justice Brennan as a “romantic” liberal whose comprehensive 
vision of a constituted society [was] one of individuals enabled (insofar as
institutional arrangements can enable them) to choose and shape their own
identities and lives (in part through contention over aims for the institutions they
share) through vistas of possibility opened by . . . “critically interactive” social
engagements, thriving on difference, dissent, and even disturbance.147 
Thus, freedom of expression was for Brennan “both an individual right of 
self-presentation—of efficacious participation or citizenship—and a social­
145. Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 477, 545–46 (1991) (“To most contemporary lawyers, it seems fair to say, the mention of
the First Amendment evokes, first and foremost, free speech. . . . Some commentators
have conflated the freedom of religion with other First Amendment rights as a form of
expression, or referred to it obliquely as freedom of conscience.  The scant space accorded
to First Amendment religion issues in constitutional law texts and casebooks provides 
further evidence of an implicit ranking of constitutional values in which protection of 
religious freedom does not enjoy high standing.”).  Cf. Douglas Laycock, Reflections on 
Two Themes: Teaching Religious Liberty and Evolutionary Changes in Casebooks, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1642, 1643–45 (1988) (lamenting lack of coverage of religious liberty
questions in most constitutional law casebooks) (book review). 
146. Charles Fried, Remarks at the Meeting of the Supreme Court Bar Adopting
Resolutions in Memory of William J. Brennan, Jr. 1–2 (May 22, 1998) (typescript on file 
with author).
147. Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in
William J. Brennan, Jr.’s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1266 (1991) (quoting 
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 638
(1990)). 
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structural provision for imbuing social life with frictional contact with
human ‘otherness.’”148  Moreover, the principle of freedom of expression, in
the larger context of a “romantic” constitutionalism, included an “exceptional
regard for agitation and eccentricity, even at some cost to public order,
as a vital matter of both personal liberty and democratic social structure.”149 
Seen in this light, Sherbert’s reliance on free speech precedent suddenly
clicks. 
I find much of Justice Brennan’s constitutional vision stirring and
intellectually compelling.  Having clerked for him, I can also testify to the 
force and integrity of the spirit behind that vision.  But, as applied to the 
problem of religion-based exemptions, it was inadequate.  First, while 
many aspects of Brennan’s constitutional legacy could survive even when 
the grand sensibility that forged them lost its majority on the Court, his
doctrine of religion-based exemptions was left stranded, without its own 
intellectual foundation, as a constitutional anomaly.  Second, because
Brennan’s views about free exercise were part of a larger account of
human flourishing, he did not always pay enough heed to the specific 
demands of the religious nomos. Thus, for example, he sometimes did not
see the real stakes in claims of religious institutional autonomy.150  And
when religious norms clashed, not with a routine law, but with a basic 
assumption of his vision of a just society, he sometimes gave them short
shrift.151  One practical result was an inconsistency that further weakened
 148. Id. at 1268. 
149. Id. at 1275. 
150. This might help explain, for example, Brennan’s approval of the “neutral 
principles of law” approach to intra-religious disputes. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 
595, 602 (1979) (majority opinion by Blackmun, J., joined by Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist, 
and Stevens, JJ.); Md. and Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, Inc., 
396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
151. I am thinking here in particular of Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 
574, 577, 604 (1983) (upholding denial of tax-exempt charitable status to educational 
institutions that engaged in religiously-motivated racial discrimination).  For legal-
pluralist critiques of Bob Jones, see, e.g., Cover, The Supreme Court, supra note 8, at 60– 
68; Dane, The Public, the Private, and the Sacred, supra note 102.  I clerked the year that
Bob Jones was decided, and discuss my evolving views about that difficult and troubling 
case in Dane, The Public, the Private, and the Sacred, supra note 102, at 44–45 & n.153. 
See also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 447 (1971) (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan, J.) (upholding denial of conscientious objector status to draftees with religious 
objections to particular wars, but not to “war in any form”); cf. Corp. of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 340 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (agreeing that limited exemption of non-profit religious organizations 
from reach of civil rights laws does not violate establishment clause, but emphasizing
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the doctrine of religion-based exemptions and prepared it for Scalia’s effort 
at deconstruction.
There was, in sum, a splendid seamlessness to William Brennan’s
constitutional vision. But the problem of religion-based exemptions is all
about seams.  Like other problems of sovereignty, it is about the effort to
stitch together, or at least make legal sense of, competing and often
contradictory normative worlds.  Brennan’s constitutional vision, committed 
as it was to diversity, agitation, and the transformative potential of liberty,
accommodated and even welcomed religious difference.  But the real task
at hand, which Brennan avoided in Sherbert, was not to fit religion into a 
coherent constitutionalism, but to mediate an encounter between two forms 
of constituted authority.  In the end, Brennan’s comprehensive constitutional
vision became, in this context at least, a gloriously dazzling example of 
constitutional glare. 
4.
I have criticized both Scalia’s opinion in Smith and Brennan’s opinion
in Sherbert for remaining trapped in the discourse of ordinary constitutional
analysis.  Though the opinions reach opposite conclusions, neither recognized 
that claims to religion-based exemptions might be both compelling and
constitutionally “anomalous.”  One might suppose, therefore, that I would 
now argue that the only way for the Court to articulate the case for
constitutionally-required exemptions would be by squarely recognizing 
that religious communities are genuine sovereigns analogous to foreign
states. Indeed, the Court could have adopted an exemptions doctrine
grounded in a language of jurisdictional recognition. But that, as I have 
discussed, might have been even more difficult.  Asking the courts to adopt a
fully-articulated discourse of religious juridical authority might be asking 
too much.  And, under the right circumstances, it might legitimately be
unnecessary.
Legal argument, as others have pointed out, is a practice of discourse, 
not an algorithm.152  It operates within certain constraints, even as it re­
evaluates and revises the very constraints within which it operates.153 
that these “cases present a confrontation between the rights of religious organizations 
and those of individuals.”). 
152. Cf. DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996) (analyzing what is involved in 
saying something is true or false as a matter of law); Meyer, supra note 104, at 743; James 
Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1367–68 (1995). 
153. See Perry Dane, Spirited Debate: A Comment on Edward B. Foley’s Jurisprudence 
and Theology, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1213, 1220–21 (1998).  In fact, this is probably a 
characteristic of all discourse, and not only legal argument.  Cf. HILARY PUTNAM,PRAGMATISM:
AN OPEN QUESTION 34–35, 46–47, 68–69 (1995) (describing how the meaning of the
94
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Doctrinal arguments often stretch their meaning, and find their compelling 
force, through allusion and subtextual complication.  From a certain distance, 
we are entitled to characterize a species of legal argument as “sovereignty­
talk” or “rights-talk” or some combination of the two.  But inside legal
argument itself, such labels might be superfluous. 
This is the place, then, to return to my earlier allusion to double-coding. 
As understood here, double-coding occurs when a work of the legal imagination
manages to convey, at the same time, two different meanings that are both
complementary and in tension.  Often, one meaning is carried by the explicit
line of a legal text or argument, and is relatively restrained or conventional,
while the other meaning is implicit or embedded, and is also more radical
and expansive.154 
Double-coding is a powerful and coherent resource of the legal 
imagination, not a symptom of indeterminacy or vacuity.  Identifying
double-coding, therefore, bears only the slightest resemblance to the 
unearthing of contradictions in the spirit of “critical legal studies.”155  It is
also different, in two respects, from the typical reductionist move that 
simply displaces the self-understanding of doctrine in favor of an allegedly 
deeper, truer explanation of legal results.156  First, paying heed to double­
“language games” we use is influenced by social experience and is not algorithmic). But 
I leave to Part IV a more explicit effort to make those connections. 
154. Cf. DAVID PENCHANSKY, WHAT ROUGH BEAST? IMAGES OF GOD IN THE HEBREW 
BIBLE 15 (1999) (discussing how “traditional” and “seditious” stories simultaneously
“inhabit the space” of some Biblical texts).  For important discussions, which resonate to
varying degrees with my own, celebrating the multi-layered potential of legal discourse, 
see, for example, JAMES BOYD WHITE, The Judicial Opinion and the Poem: Ways of
Reading, Ways of Life, in HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE
LAW 107, 119–33 (1985); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN 
CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM, at xi (1990); Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and 
Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280, 2294 (1989); David Cole, Agon at
Agora: Creative Misreadings in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 858 
(1986); Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal 
Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1594 (1990); Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles 
(And Do They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1447–48 (1995); Steven Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1387 
(1988).
155. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 114 
(1984); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1685 (1976); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 611, 627 (1988). 
156. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 5 (1984);
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 9 
(1987); Donald H. J. Hermann, A Structuralist Approach to Legal Reasoning, 48 S. CAL.
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coding does not imply that one layer of legal meaning is more real than
the other, only that they coexist.  Second, while reductionism often treats 
conventional legal doctrine as mere verbiage, a hypothesis of double-coding
posits that a doctrinal formula, by its own terms, points to, or has embedded 
within it, or stands in a dialectical relationship with, its more subversive 
and implicit re-formulations.  Or, to put it another way, while reductionism 
often has little use for close reading, the analysis I have in mind cannot do 
without it.
To see the potential power of double-coding at work in the debate over
religion-based exemptions, one might look to Wisconsin v. Yoder. Even 
commentators sympathetic to its result have often criticized the tone of 
Yoder.157  But Yoder did expressly recognize the communal, often insular,
character of religious normativity, and thus, unlike Sherbert, at least hinted at
a discourse of sovereignty-talk.  On the other hand, Yoder is permeated 
by a romanticization that not only damages its credibility overall, but is
directly at war with a genuine effort at juridical respect.158 
A more interesting and powerful example of the potential of double-
coding does, however, exist in the Supreme Court’s conversation about
religion-based exemptions.  Unfortunately, it only appeared after Smith, 
in the lonely and stillborn opinion of Justice Souter, concurring in the
L. REV. 1131, 1192 (1975).  For general critiques of such reductionism, see, for example, 
DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 179 (1996); ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE
LAW 21 (1995); WHITE, supra note 152, at xi–xii. 
157. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1259 (2d ed. 
1988); James D. Gordon III, Wisconsin v. Yoder and Religious Liberty, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1237, 1238 (1996); cf. Steven D. Smith, Wisconsin v. Yoder and the Unprincipled Approach
to Religious Freedom, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (1996) (“I admire Yoder because it is 
an unprincipled, religiously discriminatory decision presented in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Warren Burger.”).
158. Cf. Robert Douglas Chesler, Images of Community, Ideology of Authority: The 
Moral Reasoning of Chief Justice Burger, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 479 (1983)
(“Despite Burger’s use of communitarian imagery, he in fact supports traditional
majoritarian values and the officials and structures entrusted with their preservation.”);
Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory of 
First Amendment Exemptions From Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. L.
REV. 9, 55–56 (2001) (“It was bad enough that Chief Justice Burger needlessly favored 
religion over non-religion in finding an exemption from compulsory school attendance 
laws. Even worse, the Chief Justice expressed a strong preference for some religions over 
others.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges Were Angels: Religious Equality, Free 
Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 1189, 1225–27 
(2008). The profound danger that romanticism poses to genuine sovereignty-talk has also
been noticed in the American Indian law literature. See, e.g., Philp S. Deloria, The Era of 
Indian Self-Determination: An Overview, in 4 INDIAN SELF-RULE 191, 201–04 (Kenneth
R. Philip ed., 1986); Philip P. Frickey, Context and Legitimacy in Federal Indian Law, 94 
MICH. L. REV. 1973, 1979 & n.21 (1996) (book review). 
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judgment in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.159 
In Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Court sought to demonstrate that the Free
Exercise Clause still had some bite even after Smith, by striking down a 
local ordinance banning animal sacrifice.160  The entire Court agreed that
the case did not directly raise the question of religion-based exemptions, 
but instead went to the facial validity of the ordinance—in the Court’s
formulation, whether the ordinance was “neutral” and “of general
applicability” in the first place.161  Justice Souter, however, used his opinion 
as an occasion to urge that the Court reconsider Smith, and, more important, 
to begin to articulate, in a self-consciously exploratory way, a more cogent 
defense of the idea of religion-based exemptions.
The first thing to note about Souter’s opinion in Lukumi Babalu Aye is 
that unlike the dissenting opinions in Smith, it finally abandons the effort 
to assimilate religion-based exemptions into the mold of other First 
Amendment liberties.  Instead, it looks to the rubric of “neutrality” among
religions—the same idea that in different form animated the majority in 
Smith.162 
Souter’s argument from “neutrality” is not original, as he recognizes.  It 
had appeared in recent scholarly articles, which he cites.163  The argument 
was even present, though rarely stressed, in earlier cases including Sherbert.164 
But Souter’s formulation is particularly focused.  He observes that a “law
that is religion neutral on its face or in its purpose may lack neutrality in 
its effect by forbidding something that religion requires or requiring 
something that religion forbids.”165 
159. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559 
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 
160. 
161. 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 542–47. 
Id. at 531–32. 
162. Id. at 559–64. 
163. In particular, Souter cited two important and influential articles: Douglas Laycock,
993 (1990) and Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
164. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409 (1963) (“[Exemption] reflects nothing more 
than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences . . . .”); see 
also, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 142 & n.7, 145
(1987); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (“A regulation neutral on its face 
may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”). 
165.  Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 561 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Souter knows that his invocation of neutrality is only the beginning of
an argument. Whether the First Amendment actually requires religion-
based exemptions “depends on the meaning of neutrality as the Free Exercise 
Clause embraces it.”166  At least at first glance, though, looking to neutrality
seems a particularly inauspicious beginning for several reasons.
First, neutrality, like its cousin equality, is a notoriously content-free 
idea.167  The relevant question is always neutrality with respect to what
good or value or ideal.168  Souter recognizes this problem, and tries to deal
with it by labeling the neutrality required in Smith “formal” and the neutrality
that might entail religion-based exemptions “substantive.”169  This will
not do, however.  The use of the label “formal” here has a conclusory,
bogeyman quality to it.170  To the opponent of religion-based exemptions, 
the neutrality such exemptions violate is “substantive,” as is the interpretation 
of neutrality under which they would be denied.171 
Second, the form of neutrality that Souter invokes—“substantive neutrality”
—closely resembles what some have called “equality of effect” or outcome
or result.172  The problem is that the debate over equality of effect, in
distinction to equality of “treatment,” is among the most contentious in 
166. Id.
167. See Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1212,
1218 (1997); Cass R Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection
Clause, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 129–30; Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95
HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982). 
168. This basic point is conceded even by many of those who nevertheless believe 
that the ideal of equality is central to American public values. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst,
Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 249 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, How Empty is
the Idea of Equality?, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1169–70 (1983). 
169. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 561–
62 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
170. Cf.  WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN
AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 3 (1994); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 
509–10 (1988) (“Even a cursory look at the literature reveals scant agreement on what it
is for decisions in law, or perspectives on law, to be formalistic, except that whatever 
formalism is, it is not good.”); Steven M. Quevedo, Comment, Formalist and
Instrumentalist Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 CAL. L. REV. 119, 121–22 (1985) 
(providing criticisms of the formalist legal style).
171. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536–37 (1997) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–55 (1985)) (arguing that certain
religious exemptions demonstrate a governmental preference for religion and thus violates 
the First Amendment); William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally 
Compelled Free Exercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. 357, 358–59 (1990) (arguing that 
exemptions can favor religion in violation of the Establishment Clause); Suzanna Sherry, 
Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 124 (1993) (describing the 
Constitutional problems that arise due to the tension between the Free Exercise Clause and 
the Establishment Clause).
172. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223–27 (1978); Anne Phillips,
Defending Equality of Outcome, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 1, 6 (2004). 
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moral and political philosophy as well as law.173 And the specific difficulty 
for Souter, which he never addresses directly, is that the Court has in a
variety of contexts rejected equality of effect as a guiding principle of 
constitutional law.174  In a sense, Souter has gone from the frying pan of a
facile analogy with free speech to the fire of a disadvantageous analogy 
with equal protection.
Finally, even as an argument for equality of effect, Souter’s position is 
vulnerable. Most such arguments, after all, have at their core some claim 
of distributive injustice.175  Consider, for example, Anatole France’s caustic
observation that “The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well
as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.”176 
The bite of this attack on “formal” equality is that it is also, inextricably,
an attack on economic deprivation.  But it is not obvious what distributive 
claim, if any, underlies Souter’s argument for “substantive” neutrality.
The legal scholars who were promoting “substantive neutrality” at the 
173. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 172, at 224; DOUGLAS RAE, EQUALITIES 132–33
(1981); THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 4–5 (1991); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JUSTICE 65 (1971); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 1 (1992); C. Edwin 
Baker, Equality of Income or Equality of Respect, The Substantive Content of Equal 
Protection, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 933–34 (1983); Catherine Barnard & Bob
Hepple, Substantive Equality, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 562, 564 (2000); Ronald Dworkin, 
What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 185, 185–86 (1981); 
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
283, 288 (1981); Stephen O’Hanlon, Equality, Entitlement, and Efficiency, Dworkin, 
Nozick, and Posner, and Implications for Legal Theory, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y &
ETHICS J. 31, 45–52 (2009); Ann Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L.J. 
375, 427 (1980–81).  For a specific critique of robust religious accommodations on the 
basis that they reinforce religious hierarchies and perpetuate other forms of inequality, see 
Aileen McColgan, Class wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace, 38 INDUS. L.
J. 1, 23–24 (2009). 
174. See generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Arlington 
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam). See generally Mario L. Barnes & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059 
(2011); Stephen F. Ross, Charter Insights for American Equality Jurisprudence, 21 WINDSOR
Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 227 (2002) (distinguishing the more formal equality jurisprudence of 
the United States Supreme Court with the more substantive approach of its Canadian 
counterpart).
175. See generally Philip W. Blumstein & Eugene A. Weinstein, The Redress of 
Distributive Injustice, 74 AM. J. OF SOC. 408 (1969) (discussing distributive injustice through 
social experiments).
176. ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 87 (1894). 
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time Souter was writing appreciated this problem, suggesting various
“baselines” against which to measure unequal effects.177  But these efforts
have proven notoriously hard to defend.178  Moreover, these difficulties are
really just another symptom of the apparently subjective, “anomalous,” 
character of religion-based claims.  As the philosopher Thomas Nagel has 
observed, reconciling subjective and objective values in a scheme of equality 
is a particularly challenging, maybe intractable, problem.179  Indeed, it is 
not surprising that some of the leading philosophical accounts of a liberal 
conception of equality are unsympathetic, or lukewarm, to generalized 
arguments for religion-based exemptions.180 
Nevertheless, Souter’s opinion—understood in its full texture—could
have been a genuine and powerful advance. Whatever the precise details
of the argument, neutrality-talk is an effective bridge between the general
conventions of constitutional discourse and the distinctive claims of 
religion. This was apparent, not only to Souter and contemporary scholars,
but to the founding generation as well.  In the words of the Virginia 
177. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal 
Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986); McConnell 
& Posner, supra note 163, at 10–14.  See also Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality
Revisited, 110 W. Va. L. Rev. 51, 84–85 (2007). 
178. See Kent Greenawalt, 2 Religion and the Constitution 451–56, 462–79 (2009); 
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison’s Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional 
Order, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 347, 358 (1995) (arguing that Laycock’s and McConnell’s
efforts to construct a constitutional baseline for religious neutrality are “hopelessly
speculative”); Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 319– 
21 (1990); Steven D. Smith, Separation as a Tradition, 18 J.L. & POL. 215, 227–28 (2002);
Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem of Symmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 710– 
23 (2005).  See generally Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Yoder and the Question of Equality, 
25 CAP. U.L. REV. 789 (1996). 
179. See NAGEL, supra note 173, at 4–5. 
180. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 190–200 (1996 ed.); NAGEL,
supra note 173, at 166–67; Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1377–403 (2012). See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE
G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM & THE CONSTITUTION (2010). See also  BRIAN LEITER,
WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? (2012). For an effort to ground distinctive religious rights on 
an account of religion as a “proxy” for other goods recognized within the liberal philosophical
framework, see Koppelman, supra note 22. 
Particularly interesting and revealing in this regard is the account of Ronald Dworkin, 
who combines a coolness to religion-based exemptions from otherwise applicable laws
with the expansive, probably implausible, view that certain specific freedoms, such as the
right to abortion or euthanasia, are inherently and objectively matters of the free exercise
of religion. See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION,
EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 165–66 (1993, Vintage ed. 1994); Ronald Dworkin,
Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 
381, 413–15, 419–25 (1992).  See also  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
200–01 (1977). For an important reflection of Dworkin’s attitude to religion and religious
rights, see Paul Horwitz, “A Troublesome Right”: The “Law” in Dworkin’s Treatment of 
Law and Religion, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1225 (2014). 
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Declaration of Rights, “all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience.”181 
More to the point though, Souter rightly saw that the argument about
religion-based exemptions is partly an argument between different conceptions
of neutrality.  The real choice, however, is not between “substantive” and 
“formal” neutrality, but between neutrality within a normative system and
neutrality among normative systems.  This, in fact, is the same dilemma
that faces regular choice of law.182  Moreover, the key to resolving this
dilemma must lie, not in picking a given distributional metric or baseline 
against which to measure neutrality or equality, but in being willing to
accommodate a plurality of metrics.  Thus, for example, the philosopher 
Michael Walzer, in a book devoted significantly to articulating a “pluralistic”
and “complex” theory of equality, gives this account of one of the oldest 
of religion-based exemptions, conscientious exemption from military
services. The religion clauses, Walzer argues, bar 
any attempt at communal provision in the sphere of grace. . . . [T]his is called
religious liberty, but it is also religious egalitarianism.  The First Amendment is 
a rule of complex equality.  It does not distribute grace equally; indeed, it does
not distribute it at all.  Nevertheless, the wall that it raises has profound
distributive effects. . . . 
The willingness to tolerate (religious) conscientious objection has its origin 
in . . . sensitivity [to this proposition]. . . .  People who believe that the safety 
of their immortal souls depends upon avoiding any sort of participation in warfare 
are exempt from the draft. Though the state cannot guarantee immortality, it at
least refrains from taking it away.183 
To be sure, Souter’s opinion does not put the matter this way.  But my
claim—what I mean by double-coding—is that it points there.  By stating 
181. Virginia Declaration of Rights, Art. XVI (1776), in 10 SWINDER, SOURCES AND
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS, at 50.
182. See Mark Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 IOWA L. REV. 893, 902
(1988) (“Unequal treatment of people is inevitable in the conflict of laws.  The only way
it could be avoided is for states to take jurisdiction and apply their laws in every case
brought in their courts.  This treats people equally, but at the cost of discriminating against 
other states.”). See also Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96
YALE L.J. 1191, 1215–16 (1987) (“The norm of equality seems violated when the fortuity
of where a case is brought determines the outcome.  But it also seems violated when a 
single forum treats two cases differently simply because of the fortuity of where some . . .
party is domiciled.”). 
183. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
245–46 (1983). 
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as he does, 
e encounter 
Souter maps the discourse of neutralit
and adjustment of normative worlds. 
y as a 
5.
Neither Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Sherbert nor Justice 
Souter’s separate opinion in Lukumi Babalu Aye squarely embraces 
sovereignty-talk.  It is a fair question, then, why I have treated Brennan’s 
opinion as a doctrinal dead-end and Souter’s opinion as a piece of
imaginative double-coding.  There is, however, a genuine difference between 
the two. Souter’s argument opens itself to a further layer of meaning in a 
way that Brennan’s opinion does not.  The assimilation of free exercise to
free speech is a closed circuit.  But, as Souter recognizes, the slogan of 
neutrality is necessarily incomplete.184  It can point in several directions, 
and it is in the implications of those choices, whether explicitly articulated
or not, that true meaning resides. 
To see my point more clearly, return for a moment to one of the
metaphors I used earlier to describe double-coding—the optical illusion of
the vase and the faces. A feature of this and other ambiguous or “multistable” 
pictures is that each of its images is formed from the other.185  The vase
arises out of the faces. More precisely, when we see the vase, we treat it
as a figure against a “poorly delineated, more amorphous” ground, by my
analogy as an explicit text against a set of implicit assumptions.186 But, 
with a little attention, the ground can become a figure in its own right, and 
help us more fully discern the nature of the construction. 
184.  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 561–62. 
185. See MARK FINEMAN, THE NATURE OF VISUAL ILLUSION 109–22 (1981, Dover
ed. 1996). 
186. Id. at 111. 
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Ultimately, Souter seems partly aware of this himself.  With the luxury
of writing an opinion concurring in the judgment, he comes to no firm 
conclusions.  But the ground of his analysis peeks through.  Souter’s opinion
does not end with a paean to neutrality.  Instead, in language noticeably— 
resoundingly—more direct and forthright than any of Justice Brennan’s 
formulations in Sherbert,187 he write poignantly and powerfully of the clash
of religious and state authority and the individual believer’s normative 
dilemma: 
The extent to which the Free Exercise Clause requires government to refrain from 
impeding religious exercise defines nothing less than the respective relationships
in our constitutional democracy of the individual to government and to God.
“Neutral, generally applicable” laws, drafted as they are from the perspective 
of the non-adherent, have the unavoidable potential of putting the believer to a 
choice between God and government.  Our cases now present competing answers
to the question when government, while pursuing secular ends, may compel 
disobedience to what one believes religion commands.  The case before us is
rightly decided without resolving the existing tension, which remains for another 
day when it may be squarely faced.188 
Thus, he juxtaposes the discourses of equality, liberty, and normative pluralism,
and suggests, if only tentatively, a way to combine them.
6.
The notion of substantive equality that Justice Souter embraced, with 
its overtones of something much deeper, did not prevail on the Court.  But 
it did find its way into RFRA.189  And RFRA has held the fort of religious
exemptions for more than twenty years, filling at least some of the gap 
created by Smith.  But our normative discourse almost cannot help but see 
even that exercise as “anomalous.”  Much like C.S. Lewis’s child in the 
dungeon, we cannot but help assume that there must be “pencil marks 
there.”190
 187. See discussion supra Section III.D.3. 
188. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 577 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2) (2012) (“laws ‘neutral’ toward religion may burden
religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise”).
190. LEWIS, supra note 98, at 68. 
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IV. 

The differences between claims for religion-based exemptions and claims
for religious institutional autonomy are to some extent built into the logic
and structure of the religion-state relationship.  As I have emphasized though,
the particular course of American doctrinal development has had a good
deal of contingency about it.  One might have imagined an alternative
story in which our free exercise doctrine would have been expansive and
robust while our institutional autonomy doctrine would have been crabbed 
and pallid.  The passage of RFRA, a part of the story that I have not discussed 
very much, restored some of the substantive rights and doctrines evacuated
by Smith. But it also might have unintentionally helped to cut off further 
productive conversation by giving judges and lawyers a collection of
specific words to chew on. 
The causes of our current situation are, to sum up, partially substantive, 
related both to the politics of the moment and a larger-scale increasingly
skeptical attitude toward religion, its normative claims, and its juridical
dignity. But they are also the product of specific interventions by courts,
legislatures, scholars, politicians, litigants, and citizens. And, not least of 
all, which is the point I have argued most strenuously in this Article, they
are the product of a failure of imagination—an inability or unwillingness 
to appreciate the role of double-coding in legal thought and its power in
the context of the state’s encounter with religion to draw on and render 
invisibly visible the master metaphor of existential encounter.  That failure is
the most consistent part of the story, if for no other reason than that it appears
so starkly in both Justice Brennan’s opinion in Sherbert and Justice Scalia’s
opinion in Smith.  It also points to a larger failure of the contemporary legal 
imagination whose full scope is well beyond the scope of this Article.  We 
live in an age of flattened legal, constitutional, and normative discourse,
an age reluctant to appreciate complexity, plurality, multivocality, and 
multidimensionality.191  The consequences are in odd ways both statist
and libertarian.  The reaffirmation of religious institutional autonomy—at
least in the context of the ministerial employment problem found in
Hosanna-Tabor—might stand out as a sort of exception.  Or perhaps religious
institutional autonomy is, in some sense, and uniquely among the three 
strands of religion and state jurisprudence, just flat enough to survive the 
bulldozer.
191. Trends in legal scholarship have by no means been immune from the current 
mood. I wonder, for example, how many leading contemporary legal scholars would or 
could write an article that read anything like Robert Cover’s Nomos and Narrative. See
Cover, The Supreme Court, supra note 8. 
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